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THE MODELS OF NETWORK FORMATION 
Implications of network approach in labor markets 
 
Social networks play an important role in many significant economic relationships, and further in a wide 
range of interactions, including the transmission of job information, how much education one gets and 
how diseases spread. Networks affect the flow of information, which makes it critical to understand 
which networks structures are likely to emerge in an economy and how social network structures affect 
behavior. Networks have been long present in the sociology but the importance of networks in 
economics has not been acknowledged until the early 1990’s. Furthermore, the amount of social 
networking sites has increased rapidly during the past few years, which makes this field of research a 
very current issue. 
 
In this literature review, I dedicate a substantial part to study the various models of network formation. I 
analyze the differences between the distinct groups of network formation. My other aim is to examine 
the very effects of networks, i.e. the emerged network structures to the economy. Here, I address the 
study especially on how networks affect job finding and how one can explain duration dependence of 
unemployment and persistent inequality of wages with the presence of networks. I compare the search 
theory with the labor market theories assuming network approach. My goal is thus to show the 
importance of the network approach in economic theories with the labor market example. 
 
MAIN FINDINGS 
The first and the most known model in random graph literature is the static Erdös and Rényi (1959) 
model where the probability of link formation is Poisson distributed. Basic random graph model fails to 
replicate many features present in the real social networks such as clustering and “small-world” effects. 
One major shortcoming is the assumption of independent link formation; therefore e.g. models of 
homophilous networks have been developed. Random-graph models do not analyze the link formation 
process on agent level or the stability and efficiency as does strategic models; consequently, strategic 
models are more prevalent in the economic literature. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduce the 
equilibrium concept of pairwise stability in their strategic formation model. Another pioneering one is 
the game theoretic, noncooperative model by Bala and Goyal (2000). Applications of game-theoretic 
models include dynamic models, network formation with heterogeneous agents and with endogenous 
link strength. 
 
Networks are a significant means of acquiring a job. There are labor market models implementing 
network approach with both fixed and variable network structure. Network approach explains the 
duration dependence of unemployment by the fact that longer history of unemployment is more likely to 
come when the direct and indirect connections of an agent are unemployed. Inequality explicated by 
networks appears in the difference of wage levels and dropout rates. Network approach provides a 
complementary theory to search model in deliberating labor market phenomena. The key finding and 
the key merit of the network approach is the fact that it does not assume anonymous markets; the 
network structure determines which agents meet and operate together in the market. The impact of 
networks on information transmission patterns is supposedly significant because access to information is 
heavily influenced by social structure. Networks most likely reduce the problem of information 
asymmetry but it also causes individuals to have asymmetric positions in the economy with respect to 
access to information, which might result in persistent inequality between individuals. Networks might in 
fact be one source of market frictions. Within this light, networks deserve more attention in economic 
theories. One should also account for the growing role of Internet and institutions in the research.   
 
Key words: Networks, network formation model, job search, labor market theories, anonymous markets, 
information transmission  
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Sosiaalisilla verkostoilla on merkittävä osa tärkeissä taloudellisissa suhteissa sekä monenlaisessa vuoro-
vaikutuksessa, kuten työpaikoista kertovan tiedon välittymisessä. Verkostot vaikuttavat myös yksilöiden 
koulutustasoon, tautien leviämiseen ja siihen, mitä kieliä puhutaan. Koska verkostot vaikuttavat tiedon 
kulkuun, on tärkeää ymmärtää, minkälaisia verkostorakenteita todennäköisesti syntyy ja miten verkosto–
rakenne vaikuttaa taloudellisten toimijoiden käyttäytymiseen. Verkostoja on jo kauan tutkittu sosiolo–
giassa, mutta verkostojen merkitys taloustieteessä on tunnustettu vasta 1990-luvun alussa. Lisäksi 
sosiaalisten verkostoitumissivustojen määrä on viime vuosina kasvanut voimakkaasti, minkä vuoksi aihe 
on erittäin ajankohtainen. 
 
Käsittelen tässä kirjallisuuskatsauksessa laajasti erilaisia verkostonmuodostumismalleja ja pyrin tarkaste-
lemaan eri muodostumismalliryhmien välisiä eroja. Edelleen tavoitteenani on tutkia verkostojen ja 
verkostorakenteiden vaikutusta talouteen. Keskityn tutkimaan sitä, miten verkostot vaikuttavat työn 
etsimiseen ja työllistymiseen, ja sitä, miten verkostonäkökulmalla voidaan selittää työttömyyden kestoa 
ja myös palkkojen epäsuhtaisuutta eri ryhmien välillä. Vertaan etsintäteoriaa (search theory) ja verkosto-
näkökulmaan perustuvia työmarkkinamalleja. Pyrin näin osoittamaan verkostonäkökulman tärkeän 
merkityksen taloudellisissa teorioissa. 
 
TULOKSET 
Tunnetuin satunnaiseen muodostumiseen perustuva verkostomalli (random graph) on Erdös ja Rényin 
(1959) malli, jossa linkin muodostumistodennäköisyys noudattaa Poisson-jakaumaa. Random graph -
mallit eivät pysty kuvaamaan oikeiden verkostojen ominaisuuksia, kuten klusteroitumista ja small-world-
ilmiötä. Suuri puute on myös se, että monissa malleissa oletetaan linkkien muodostuvan itsenäisesti. 
Poikkeuksia ovat mm. homofiiliset verkostonmuodostumismallit, sekä eksponentiaaliset random graph –
muodostumismallit. Random graph mallit tarkastelevat linkinmuodostumisprosessia verkostotasolla kun 
taas strategiset mallit kuvaavat prosessia agenttitasolla; tärkeänä osana on syntyneen verkoston 
tasapainon ja tehokkuuden tutkiminen. Jacksonin ja Wolinskyn (1996) strategisen muodostumisen malli 
perustuu parilliseen tasapainoon (pairwise stability). Toinen uraauurtava malli on Bala ja Goyalin (2000) 
peliteoreettinen malli. Peliteoreettisia muunnelmia ovat mm. dynaaminen malli, heterogeenisten 
agenttien malli sekä malli, jossa linkin vahvuus on endogeeninen muuttuja.  
 
Verkostot ovat merkittävä tekijä työllistymisessä. Verkostonäkökulmaan perustuvat työmarkkinamallit 
voidaan jakaa kahteen ryhmään; kiinteän verkostorakenteen olettavat sekä vaihtuvan verkostorakenteen 
olettavat mallit. Verkostoteoria selittää työttömyyden kestoriippuvuutta (duration dependence) sillä, että 
pidempiaikainen työttömyys on todennäköisempää silloin kun agentin suorat ja epäsuorat kontaktit ovat 
työttömiä. Palkkatasoerot eri ryhmien, välillä johtunevat  ryhmien eroista työmarkkinoiden ulkopuolelle 
jättäytymisessä. 
 
Verkostonäkökulma tarjoaa etsintäteorian ohella täydentävän teorian työmarkkinailmiöiden 
selittämiseen. Verkostoteorian yksi pääansioista on kritiikki anonyymejä markkinoita kohtaan; 
verkostorakenne määrittelee ketkä tapaavat ja toimivat riippuvuussuhteessa markkinoilla. Verkostojen 
vaikutus tiedonkulkuun on tiettävästi merkittävä, sillä sosiaalinen rakenne määrittää tiedon saatavuutta. 
Verkostot myös vähentänevät informaatioasymmetriaa, mutta toisaalta verkostojen takia yksilöiden 
informaatiotaso taloudessa on asymmetrinen. Tämä voi johtaa pysyvään epätasa-arvoon taloudellisten 
toimijoiden välillä, verkostot voivat siis aiheuttaa merkittävästi markkinakitkaa. Verkostot ansaitsevat siis 
enemmän huomiota taloudellisissa teorioissa. Myös Internetin ja muiden instituutioiden kasvava rooli 
tiedon välittäjänä ja verkostorakenteiden muokkaajana tulisi huomioida laajemmin. 
 
Avainsanat: Verkostot, verkostomuodostumismalli, työmarkkinateoriat, anonyymit markkinat, 
informaation välittyminen
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1. Introduction 
Research on network formation within economics is generally motivated by the observation that 
network structures play an important role in the organization of some significant economic 
relationships. The wide range of networked interactions include the buying and selling of many 
goods and services, the transmission of job information and informal insurance networks (Jackson 
and Wolinsky 1996). Social networks are also important in determining how diseases spread, which 
languages are spoken, how much education one gets and eventually, the likelihood of succeeding 
professionally. (Matthew Jackson 2008) Theoretical models of network formation have also high-
lighted the role of networks in explaining phenomena such as stock market volatility, collective 
action, the career profiles of managers, and the diffusion of new products, technologies and 
conventions (Bala and Goyal 2000). Obviously, the influence mechanism of the networks on the 
economic relationships is the fact that networks affect the flow of information. This makes it critical 
to understand which networks structures are likely to emerge in an economy and how social network 
structures affect behavior.  
 
Networks have been studied in the academic literature for many decades, most notably in sociology. 
For a long time, economists did not pay attention to the importance of networks in explaining 
economic phenomena. Around the turn of the century, it became clear that that neoclassical 
economic theory could not explain some patterns in labor markets and in the exchange of goods. 
From this pont onwards, the number of economic models with network features has exploded. 
 
1.1. The impact of networks to the economic outcome 
If the pattern of trade derives from actions taken in the manner expected in the neoclassical theory 
where economic agents are expected constantly to be initiating and ceasing interaction with one 
another as they search for the best deal, the network structures would be seemingly irrelevant when 
considering the economic outcome (Zuckerman 2003). However, social networks may have a 
significant impact on the economic outcome, and the economic process itself modifies the networks 
(Kirman 1997). How and why networks matter is nonetheless subject of significant debate. 
Granovetter (2005), a sociologist, suggests that there are three main reasons why networks affect 
the economic outcome. First, social networks affect the flow and the quality of information since 
actors do not believe impersonal sources and instead rely on people they know. Second, social 
networks are an important source for reward and for punishment. Third, trust emerges. By trust 
Granovetter means the confidence that other will do the “right” thing despite a clear balance of 
incentives to the contrary. The first aspect is the most appealing and relevant from the economic 
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point of view and thus will be the one that I pay attention to in this work – although the emergence 
of trust might have significant implications for the game theoretic modeling. Networks as a source of 
information can in fact reduce the problem of information asymmetry and the one of moral hazard. 
One interesting example of networks’ impact on market outcome is by Kirman and Vignes (1991). 
They find out that in Marseille Fish market, high proportion of buyers refrains from searching beyond 
their usual source of fish and even pay a higher price than in equilibrium as a result. This commodity 
market may be described as a patterned network of exchange. Kirman and Vignes find that in this 
networked market there is significant price dispersion and individual demand curves are not 
downward sloping. In a networked market trading with the same partners reduces the moral hazard 
problem since the quality of the goods is probably known. Also, networks might lower the search 
costs, which allows agents to pay a higher price.    
 
Furthermore, in most real labor markets social networks play a key role. Prospective employers and 
employees prefer to learn about one another from personal sources whose information they trust. It 
has obvious links to theories of asymmetric information, with the difference that there is what one 
might call bilateral asymmetry—both employer and employee have information about their own 
"quality" that the other needs (Granovetter 2005). Network perspective is able to explain further 
different fundamental features of labor markets such as the duration (or resistance) of unemploy-
ment known as duration dependence (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2004) which traditional search 
models may not fully clarify. Also, the network approach enables more realistic assumptions e.g. in 
that unemployment is not just due to frictions in the market1.  
 
Social networks are not restricted to physical networks. The popularity of social networking sites has 
grown rapidly during the past few years and the field of these online networks is evolving 
continuously. Facebook is perhaps the most popular social networking site at the moment, measured 
in terms of number of user accounts. Other popular sites include Twitter, LinkedIn and Youtube. The 
impact of these virtual networks on the economic outcome might be hard to decipher due to the 
various mechanisms the online information sharing and communication in networks affects the 
outcome. Another problem might be the difficulty to actually distinguish between the effects of 
physical and online networks. These kinds of social networks might offer new cost effective ways to 
communicate which can in turn lower searching costs and transaction costs and promote new ideas, 
that is, increase productivity and economic welfare. A recent example of the economic impacts of 
                                                 
1
 Neoclassical theory assumes that economy tends to full employment equilibrium, if the labor market worked  
properly. If there was unemployment in the economy, the wages would fall, which would result in increased 
demand for labor and finally, equilibrium is restored at full employment. Here, any unemployment is purely 
voluntary. See Picture 7 in appendix. (New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics) 
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social media tools is the study conducted by FinNode USA, Finpro and Tekes in cooperation with 
Collaborative Strategies consultant company and Elearning! Magazine (9/2009). According to the 
study, social medias such as Facebook and Twitter create opportunities by altering the business 
operations and workers’ approach, which have not been exploited in a large scale at corporate level 
yet. One exception taking advantage of social network tools is a company named Harvard Medical 
Center that was able to reduce the number of denounced from 600 to 80 by utilizing of social medias 
in the idea creating process. Among the research also corporate managers begin to understand the 
impact of social collaboration as a means to make the business more effective.  
 
1.2. Research question 
I dedicate a substantial part of my thesis to a survey of models of network formation. My other aim is 
to study the effects of networks in general and within the particular case of labor markets. The 
emphasis in the second part is on how networks affect the probabilities of finding jobs and the 
overall labor market outcome. I discuss how different models of network formation model the 
transmission of information on vacancies between labor market participants. In my mind, the 
assumption of full information is the most problematic one in the competitive model typically used in 
analyzing labor markets. The role of networks in structuring and controlling information flows within 
these markets provides a key for understanding why some workers succeed and some others are left 
out in actual labor markets. 
 
The full information results from the neoclassical assumption of anonymous markets where all the 
actors in the market meet but the identity of the actors is not relevant to the market outcome. 
Particularly, this assumption in the neoclassical model is disproved by network models. Since all 
actors are not interconnected, every agent’s information and possibilities to economic transactions 
depend who they know and deal with. Indeed, critique of Zuckerman (2003) about neoclassical 
model assuming utility maximizing agents (agents searching for the best deal) is not essentially what 
network models are criticizing.       
 
Another interesting subject of study is the influence of online social medias, including Facebook, to 
the economic outcome. However, being such a recent topic the literature available is supposedly 
limited and reliable results from the effect of online social medias are hard to obtain due to short 
time span. In addition, distinguishing between the effects of real and virtual networks might be 
troublesome. Albeit social medias are part of most of the modern world individuals’ everyday lives 
and they affect the way in which people communicate, I believe that the influence of social networks 
on the labor market outcome is as good area of study as social medias. All the economic actors are 
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participants in the networked labor markets whereas not all utilize networking sites. The findings of 
networks’ effect on labor market outcome can probably be generalized to apply also in the context of 
virtual networks. 
 
The network formation models can be divided into two main classes based on the formation 
approach adopted and further into several subclasses. I first speak about non-strategic, random 
models of network formation where the models apply also to the formation of nonsocial networks, 
such as technical networks. The majority of my work is devoted to strategic models of network 
formation where the objective is to understand the formation of networks in terms of individual 
incentives.  On my mind, the quintessence of networks from the economic perspective is the 
significant role of social and economic networks in explaining the economic outcome as compared to 
the conventional assumption of anonymous markets; consequently, social relations and informal 
institutions occupy a center stage in a large body of economics research.  
 
I consider both random and strategic form models because both approaches are present in the labor 
market models with network perspective. I have also included extensions of the game theoretic 
models that I find relevant within the labor market context but have not yet been implemented, 
most probably due to short lifespan of the field of research. 
1.2.1. Networks in the literature 
There is an extensive literature on social networks from a sociological perspective (Jackson and 
Wolinsky 1996). The economic literature about networks is not restricted to the study of the 
formation of networks, but there are various studies for instance about transportation and delivery 
networks, e.g. routing of airlines by Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1995). Microeconomic theory has 
applied network structures for issues such as the internal organization of firms (e.g. Boorman 1975), 
employment search (Montgomery 1991, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou 2005), and information 
transmission (Goyal 1993). However, one of the main contributions of the economic literature within 
this field has still been the study of endogenous formation of social networks by self-interested 
economic agents, where agents are economic or social actors (Bloch and Jackson 2006). Also, there is 
a formal game theoretic literature with cooperative approach including e.g. games with 
communication structures (Aumann and Myerson 1988, Dutta et al. 1998). Networks that have been 
subject to research in the economic literature include collaboration graphs, who talks to whom-
graphs, and information linkage graphs. There are also technological networks and networks in the 
natural world; the architecture of the technical networks, such as ICT networks, most probably affect 
to the way in which information flows but I will nonetheless not focus on the underlying factors 
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affecting information transmission. A more detailed list about the literature addressing the formation 
of networks is found in chapter 2.         
 
1.3. Results 
I discuss the network formation models that are the most important and most prevalent in the 
literature bearing in mind the labor market perspective. The best known and the first model in 
random graph literature is the static Erdös and Rényi (1959) model where the probability of link 
formation is Poisson distributed. Basic random graph model fails to replicate many features present 
in the real social networks such as clustering and “small-world” effects that many extensions, the 
dynamic scale-free model by Barabàsi and Albert (1999) for instance, try to take account for. In 
addition, one major shortcoming of many random graph models is the fact that they assume 
independent link formation. To fill this gap, Golub and Jackson (2008) have developed a model of 
homophilous networks and e.g. Snijders et al. (2006) speak about exponential random graph models 
also assuming nonindependent formation of links. Nonetheless, economics seems to be more 
interested in studying why networks form; what are the incentives for individuals to form certain 
links and how does the formation of certain network affect the economic welfare. That is why 
strategic form models are more prevailing in the economic literature.  However, random graph 
models suit better to illustrate certain link formation processes that are important from the 
economic point of view. Random models have their place describing phenomena such as the 
spreading of pandemic flu, the diffusion of new products and technologies. In random-graph models 
that I present in the third chapter the approach is quite mathematical and the focal point is the 
analysis of network structures. Random-graph models do not provide the means to properly analyze 
the actual link formation process or the stability and efficiency as do strategic models, but they 
should still be included in the study because the structural aspects do play a significant role in the 
transmission of information. 
 
I consider two fundamental strategic form models. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) present a strategic 
formation model where they introduce the equilibrium concept of pairwise stability. Another 
pioneering one is the game theoretic, noncooperative network formation model by Bala and Goyal 
(2000). Nash equilbrium in Bala and Goyal and in many other models is a quite hard concept to deal 
with compared to pairwise stability because many Nash equilibrium networks, such as empty 
networks are not efficient, thus not welfare increasing or rational with respect to individual 
incentives because forming at least one link is shown to be welfare increasing. Pairwise stability is an 
easy but a rather weak concept to employ although it may provide strong results by narrowing the 
set of graphs substantially what Nash equilibrium fails to do. Applications of game-theoretic models 
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include dynamic model of Bala and Goyal (2000), network formation with heterogeneous agents (e.g. 
Galeotti and Goyal 2002) and link formation with endogenous link strength (Bloch and Dutta 2009). 
 
The role of social networks in explaining various economic phenomena has become more notable 
recently. For example, networks are a significant means in job search: among Montgomery (1991) 
over 50 % of individuals have found their current job through network of contacts, although there 
are differences between races and gender. Now there is also a move towards network approach in 
labor market theories because more commonly used search theoretic models do not account for the 
importance of social networks in employment process. Therefore, they are unable to rationalize 
certain phenomena such as duration dependence of unemployment and persistent inequality 
prevalent in the markets. There are labor market models implementing network approach with both 
fixed and variable network structure. Simpler models of fixed network structure include Calvó-
Armengol and Jackson (2004) and Montgomery (1991), variable network structure model is 
introduced by Calvó-Armengol (2004). 
 
Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) explain the expected probability of acquiring a job decreasing in 
the length of time that an agent has been unemployed (duration dependence) by the fact that longer 
history of unemployment is more likely to come when the direct and indirect connections of an agent 
are unemployed. Except in duration dependence of unemployment, inequality appears e.g. in the 
difference of wage levels and dropout rates. Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2007) show that any path 
connected agents’ wages are positively correlated and that agent with many links ought to receive 
multiple job offers compared to agent with only few links. Persistent inequality can arise between 
two similar initial conditions with just different initial employment conditions because the difference 
in employment conditions leads to drop-out rates of unequal height. Dropping out hurts the 
prospects of other agents in the network further, this results in deeper wage differential between 
the groups. Measuring the impact of using networks in job search to wage level is quite complicated, 
though. Recognizing the effect of networks to employment and wage levels can provide significant 
policy guidelines in decreasing the inequality in labor markets by affecting network formation by 
means of transfers, for example, to improve the position of isolated individuals with nonexistent 
contacts.    
 
As Granovetter (1974) has suggested, the impact of networks in information transmission patterns is 
supposedly significant, and the same thing also applies to the labor markets; it is the diffusion 
pattern of job information that determines who will be employed and who will not. One could also 
argue that networks are not that relevant in causing certain phenomena. But it seems that with 
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network approach, one is able to explain quite well many phenomena present in the economy. The 
theories of network formation and the labor market theories with network approach do not strive 
for providing universally applicable theories overriding previous theories such as search model in 
labor markets, but for offering complementary explanations to fill the shortcomings of some of 
assumptions of neoclassical theories.  Thus search models or efficiency wage models should not be 
abandoned altogether but network approach just adds to basic theoretical models and helps to 
understand causalities in the markets because clearly, networked markets function differently than 
those where individuals are not dependent on the structure of the network of contacts but can act 
independently. This kind of market structure with no links but only independent actors is supposedly 
only to be seen in theories.   
 
This paper is organized as follows; I introduce the basic concepts of networks in the second part and 
in part 3, I go through the random graph model of network formation and the most important 
applications. In chapter 4, I present the basic strategic and game theoretic models that are the most 
prevalent in literature. Chapter 5 is devoted to the extensions of the basic game theoretic models 
which I consider essential from the labor market perspective. In part 6 I turn to speaking about labor 
markets with network approach. I discuss some labor market models using network approach and 
think about how one can explain some phenomena in labor markets with the existence of networks. 
Chapter 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
2. Networks – an introduction  
The network literature within the field of economics dates back to the 1950’s; both the focus of the 
literature and the terminology within the analysis of formation of networks have evolved during the 
past decades. I will go through the different terms present in the literature so to elucidate the 
subject at hand. I briefly present the key characteristics of coalitions, the predecessor of networks as 
well.  
 
Most models view networks as either non-directed or directed graphs2; which type of graph is more 
appropriate depends on the context. Many social and economic relationships are reciprocal or 
require the consent of both parties to form; there are also enough applications especially in the 
context of social networking sites that take a directed form so that presenting both kinds of networks 
                                                 
2
 In mathematical graph theory, a graph is a finite set of points or nodes, together with a set of branches, each of 
which connects a pair of nodes (Myerson 1991) 
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is justified. In strategic form models one focal point is to measure the value of a network and 
determine how the value is distributed amongst the players. Random models define the 
characteristics of a network with several indicators that I thus illustrate here. 
 
2.1 Overview of the literature and terminology 
The first papers in the field of networks in economics published in 1950’s studied coalitions instead 
of networks; e.g. Shapley (1953). To be precise, endogenous coalition formation was implicit already 
in the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) theory of stable sets. The models of network formation 
have evolved from the models of coalition formation which makes understanding the notion of 
coalitions important. The properties of coalitions and networks have some different features; 
coalition structure is among Aumann and Myerson (1988) the simplest model of “framework of 
negotiations”. Coalition structure is defined as a partition of the player set into disjoint coalitions. 
Once the coalition structure has been determined, negotiations take place only within each of the 
coalitions that constitute the structure; each such coalition B divides among its members the total 
amount v(B) that it can obtain for itself. 
 
Myerson (1977) thought that coalition structure is not rich enough to capture the subtleties of 
negotiation frameworks; he referred to networks as cooperation structures3, whereas much of the 
literature that followed Myerson has used the term communication structures. Subsequently, 
Jackson (2003) called them communication games. Network games include cooperative games and 
communication games as special cases, but generally network games allow for costs and benefits to 
accrue differently to different sets of links, and allow for externalities and such across players and 
networks (Jackson 2003). Van den Nouweland (2004) referred to networks as communication 
networks which describe the bilateral channels through which individuals can communicate and 
coordinate their actions.  
 
There are two alternative approaches to model the network formation. One derives from random 
graph theory and views an economic or social relationship as a random variable. The other regards 
people or firms or other actors involved as exercising discretion in forming their relationships, and 
uses game theoretic tools to model formation. (The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics) In the 
basic random graph theory (e.g. Erdös and Rényi 1959) links form independently and the probability 
of link formation is distributed among Poisson distribution. In the study random graph models the 
emphasis is on examining the structure and properties of the graph. The strategic form network 
                                                 
3
 A cooperation structure is a graph whose vertices are identified with the players. A link between two players 
means that these players can carry on meaningful direct negotiations with each other. Coalition structure is a 
cooperation structure where two members i and j are linked iff they are in the same coalition (Dutta et al. 1998). 
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formation games describe the actual formation process. These models can be further divided into 
strategic models (e.g. Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) and game-theoretic models of network formation. 
There are both noncooperative network formation (e.g. Bala and Goyal 2000) and cooperative 
network formation models (e.g. Aumann and Drèze 1974) in the game theoretic approach. Often, the 
cooperative games are presented in reduced form as a noncooperative game due to simplicity. The 
difference between strategic models and game theoretic models underlies in their concepts of 
equilibrium.  
 
2.2. Modeling networks 
The set N = {1, ..., n } is the set of nodes that are involved in a network of relationships. Nodes are 
referred to as vertices, agents or players; nodes can be e.g. individual people, firms, countries or 
other organizations. (Jackson 2008a, Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) The notation ij Є g indicates that i 
and j are linked in network g. G = {g С gN} is the set of all possible networks on N, gN is thus denoted 
as the complete network (Marco Marini 2007). A graph (N,g) consists of a set of nodes N = {1, ..., n } 
and a real-valued nxn matrix g, where gij represents the relation between i and j (Jackson 2008a).  
 
For curiosity, a game in coalitional form is denoted as follows. Let N = {1, ..., n } be the set of players 
and (N,v) the game in characteristic function form. Coalition structure B = {B1, B2,… Bm} is defined to 
be a finite partition either of the player set N or of the universe of v. Thus, game in coalitional form is 
denoted by (N, v, B). 
 
An important goal in the analysis of strategic networks is to evaluate the economic welfare of an 
emerged network to the society, thus one has to be able to calculate a value to a network (Marini 
2007). With a value function, one can assign each network a worth. Formally, a value function for a 
network is stated as 𝑣:𝐺 → 𝑅.𝑉 is the set of all possible value functions. Also, the characteristic 
function 𝑉: 2𝑁 →  ℝ  describes how much collective payoff a set of players can gain by forming a 
network (Myerson 1991). However, value function is a richer object than a characteristic function of 
a cooperative game because the calculation may involve both costs and benefits as it allows the 
value that accrues to depend on the network structure (Jackson 2003). While the value function 
measures the worth of the whole network, the distribution of value is indicated by an allocation rule. 
An allocation rule is a function 𝑌:𝐺 × 𝑉 →  𝑅𝑁. Here, 𝑌𝑖(𝑔, 𝑣) is the payoff to player i from graph g 
under the value function v. (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) Allocation rule is important not only due to 
fairness considerations – the fact that value would be divided fairly between the players in the 
network – but also because allocation rule determines players’ incentives to form various networks 
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(Jackson 2003). The Shapley value is probably the most prevalent allocation rule in the literature4. 
These concepts provide a useful basis for making predictions about the outcomes of multilateral 
bargaining on networks, as well as more generally for analyzing the power or influence of various 
players in a network (Jackson 2008). I will not focus on stability and efficiency issues of networks in 
this work, and therefore will leave the value functions and allocation rules aside. 
 
The most common network form to appear in the strategic network formation models is the 
undirected graph, where two nodes are either connected or they are not. An undirected graph is 
such that one node cannot be related to the second without the second being related to the first 
(Jackson 2008a). A nondirected network (N,g) thus describes a system of reciprocal relationships 
between individuals (Marini 2007). For instance, if a network is a social network of people and links 
represent friendships or acquaintances, then it would tend to be non-directed. This network 
structure usually dominates in many social and economic relationships, such as partnerships, 
friendships and alliances. In Picture 1, the left-hand side network is an example of an undirected 
graph and the right-hand side of directed one. The arrows point out the direction of the link, from 
which the utility is retrieved. Here, A is connected to B but B is not connected to A. Some structures 
are better modeled as directed networks, where one node can be connected to second without the 
second being connected to the first. Directed graphs are found in networks that keep track of which 
authors cite which authors, which web pages have links to which others and in social networking 
sites where one can follow a user without his/her consent such as Twitter. The networks is directed if 
it is possible that gij ≠ gji, and a network is undirected gij = gji for all nodes i and j. (Jackson 2008) 
Picture 1. Undirected and directed network. (Easley and Kleinberg 2009) 
 
A length of a path is defined as the number of steps it contains from beginning to end, i.e. the 
number of edges in the sequence that comprise it. The paths tend to be surprisingly short and they 
connect a large fraction of the world’s population when a global network of friends is considered. 
                                                 
4
 For more discussion about allocation rules and value functions refer to e.g. Shapley (1953), Slikker and van den 
Nouweland (2001), Myerson (1977), Myerson (1991), Aumann and Drèze (1974), Harsanyi (1963), Aumann and 
Myerson (1988). 
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These features of short path length and the existence of a giant component apply to a large fraction 
of networks; the phenomenon is known as the small-world phenomenon (Easley and Kleinberg 
2009). 
 
 
Random graph networks are described by a few straight-forward concepts. A path is simply a 
sequence of nodes with the property that each consecutive pair in the sequence is connected by an 
edge. A path not repeating the nodes is called a simple path. An important non-simple path is a cycle 
with at least three edges in which the first and the last nodes are the same. A graph is connected if 
for every pair of nodes, there is a path between them. If a graph is not connected, then it breaks 
apart naturally into a set of connected “pieces," groups of nodes. A connected component of a graph 
is a subset of the nodes such that: (i) every pair of nodes in the subset has a path to every other; and 
(ii) the subset is not part of some larger set with the property that every node can reach every other. 
Moreover, large, complex networks often have what is called a giant component, an informal term 
for a connected component that contains a significant fraction of all the nodes. (Easley and Kleinberg 
2009) 
 
Most of the papers addressed to study random graph models actively evaluate the fit of emerging 
networks with real social networks. Here are a few measurements employed in the comparison. The 
degree of a vertex or a link in a graph is the number of edges that connect to it. The maximum and 
the minimum degree of a graph are simply the maximum and the minimum degree of its vertices 
(Jackson 2008b). In picture 2, the maximum degree is 3 and minimum degree is 0. In a regular graph, 
all degrees are the same where there is only a single degree of the graph.  
 
 
Picture 2. The degree of a graph. (Wikipedia)  
 
 
Regular graphs are rarely observed; the extent to which the degrees of graphs differ is measured by 
degree distributions. There are two important facts about the degree distribution properties of 
networks. Firstly, many social networks exhibit fat tails in that there are more nodes with relatively 
high and low degrees than would tend to arise if links were formed independently and totally at 
random. Secondly, it is hard to find networks that would follow a strict power law. The term power 
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law refers to the frequency of a given degree being proportional to the degree raised to a power. 
(Jackson 2008b)  
 
Clustering occurs in a network if the probability of two vertices being connected by an edge is higher 
when the vertices in question have a common neighbor, i.e. there is another vertex that they are 
both connected (Newman 2002), is also characteristic of networks. Besides degree distribution 
properties, also clustering properties, i.e. how clustering is distributed across of a network gives 
useful insight in the analysis of networks. Clustering is measured by a clustering coefficient which is 
defined as the probability that two randomly selected edges of a player are in fact linked with each 
other. As the clustering and properties of degree distributions imply, and as I will later show, links 
may not form independently. There are several factors affecting link formation which also explain the 
clustering of the nodes; many of the links form among the principle which is known as the triadic 
closure: If two people in a social network have a friend in common, then there is an increased 
likelihood that they will become friends themselves at some point in the future. (Easley and Kleinberg 
2009). 
 
 
Picture 3 Triadic closure. The formation of the edge between B and C illustrates the effects of triadic closure, since 
they have a common neighbor A. (Easley and Kleinberg 2009) 
 
There are numerous underlying factors affecting the mechanism of the formation of social networks 
that also give rise to the phenomenon of triadic closure. Easley and Kleinberg (2009) refer to factors 
influencing network formation as network’s surrounding contexts: factors that exist outside the 
nodes and edges of a network, but which nonetheless affect how the network's structure evolves. 
One of the most basic notions influencing the structure of social networks is homophily which here 
means that individuals tend to have links to others who are similar to them.  
 
Furthermore, the links formed do not need to be the same intensity. Usually, the intensity or the 
strength of a link is interpreted so that stronger links represent closer friendship and greater 
15 
 
frequency of interaction. Granovetter (1974) categorize the links in strong and weak ties. For 
research purposes one should distinguish between different levels of strength in the links of a social 
network although measuring the link strength might be quite complicated in practice. The strength of 
a link might have a significant impact e.g. to the way in which information between edges flows thus 
it is an important aspect to take into consideration.   
 
Now, I will move on to discussing the nonstrategic, random graph models of network formation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Nonstrategic models of network formation 
From the two groups of network formation, nonstrategic models view networks as arising 
stochastically and therefore use random graph theory whereas strategic models see links in a 
network as social or economic relationships chosen by the players involved, the approach thus being  
game theoretic (Jackson 2008b). In this part, I present the basic random graph models. There are also 
many papers discussing the extensions of the basic models, that strive for replicating the properties 
of real networks. The need to move towards subtler models emerges when the social connections’ 
dependence on existing relations is taken into account in the modeling process. I examine static 
extensions with preferential attachment properties, for instance (Barabási and Albert 1999). Dynamic 
modifications that I study develop the idea of preferential attachment further by assuming not self-
reliant link formation (e.g. Golub and Jackson 2008).   
 
Random graph models are useful in modeling phenomena like the spread of information or decisions 
that are heavily influenced by peers and in modeling the diffusion of diseases, for example. (Jackson 
2008a). Moreover, Granovetter (1974) speaks about the importance of weak ties in e.g. labor 
markets. Among him weak ties or links are more relevant in finding out about new job opportunities 
than strong ties. Although the strength of the link and the degree of randomness of the formation 
process is not explicitly discussed in the literature, I believe that randomly generated links represent 
a weaker form of links than the ties which form through the strategic decision making. Also, it might 
be that job information networks – the networks through which job information flows – for the most 
part form among a random process.  
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3.1. Random-Graph Models of Network Formation 
A random graph consists of some number N of nodes, connections or edges are placed between 
them so that each pairs of nodes i,j has a connecting edge with independent probability p (Newman 
et al.2002). After presenting the Erdös-Rényi model, I deliberate how the properties of a random 
graph and real networks differ. Thereafter I speak about the extensions of Erdös-Rényi model.  
3.1.1. Basic Random-Graph Models 
The Poisson random-graph models are one of the most extensively studied among the static models, 
the model of Erdös and Rényi (1959) being one of the first and the most “popular” Poisson models. 
Static refers to a typed model in which all nodes are established at the same time and the links are 
drawn between them according to some probabilistic rule (Jackson 2008a).  
The random graph model of Erdös and Rényi (1959) consists of n nodes or vertices that are joined by 
links or edges, pairs of vertices are chosen uniformly at random. There are two closely related 
variants of Erdös-Rényi-model (1959) of which more commonly studied model is G(n,p) where each 
link is formed with probability p, 𝑝 ∈ (0,1) , and the average number of links or edges in the graph is 
𝑝𝑛(𝑛 − 1)/2  (Erdös and Rényi 1959, Newman 2002). The average degree z of a vertex or a node is 
𝑧 =
𝑛 𝑛 − 1 𝑝
𝑛
=  𝑛 − 1 𝑝 ≃ 𝑛𝑝 
 
for large enough n. The distribution of the degree of a vertex is binomial: 
𝑝𝑘 =  
𝑛 − 1
𝑘
 𝑝𝑘(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−1−𝑘  
 
 where k is the degree of the node. When  the equation becomes 
𝑝𝑘 =
𝑧𝑘𝑒−𝑧
𝑘!
 
which is the Poisson distribution with large enough n. 
 
 
Picture 4. Erdös-Renyi Random Graph G, edges=316, nodes=100. 
(www.math.ucsd.edu/~fan/algo/sigma.html)  
 
 
 
With increasing degree distribution the Erdös-Rényi model 
shows phase transition which is when the giant component 
forms. A component is a subset of nodes in the graph each 
of which is reachable from the others by some path through 
the network. There is a critical value of degree distribution z 
above which the one largest component in the graph 
contains a finite fraction S of the total number of vertices. The phase transition occurs at z=1. The 
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largest component is called the giant component. Goyal, van der Leij and Moraga-Gonzáles (2006) 
say that the network has a giant component if the largest component constitutes a relatively large 
part of the vertices and all other components are small, typically of order ln(𝑛). (Newman 2002) 
 
 
3.1.2. Properties of random-graph networks and real social networks compared 
 
There are some features that random-graph models lack compared with real-life social networks. 
This is mainly because links do not necessarily form independently in reality. I will discuss 
dependencies in random network formation in the next part and in part 3.2.5. Firstly, real-world 
networks show strong clustering or network transitivity whereas Erdös and Rényi’s (1959) do not. 
Secondly, they exhibit “small-world” effect (Newman et al.2002). Thirdly, social networks tend to 
have skewed degree distributions vis-à-vis the random graph models; the degree distribution of real 
networks is thus highly different from the Poisson distribution (Newman et al. 2002, Newman 2002). 
 
The “small-world” effect was introduced by Stanley Milgram (1967), in the experiment of his 
including letters. He concluded that many pairs of seemingly distant people are connected by a very 
short chain of intermediates; the typical length of chain is only about six5. 
Clustering can be measured e.g. by clustering coefficient C (Watts and Strogatz 1998). A clustering 
coefficient for random graphs is simply C=p (Newman 2002).  
 
Below in table 1 I show a few examples how measured and random graph clustering coefficients 
differ: 
 
Network n z C measured C random graph 
Neural network 282 14.0 0.28 0.049 
Power grid 4941 2.7 0.080 0.00054 
Company directors 7673 14.4 0.59 0.0019 
Table 1. Measured and random graph clustering coefficients. 
where z is the average degree of a vertex in a network. The first two observations come from a paper 
by Watts and Strogatz (1998) and the bottom number from Newman et al. (2001).  It seems that the 
less randomly the network is formed the less correlated are the clustering coefficients. I arranged the 
networks from the most random to least random, assuming that here neural networks would be the 
most randomly formed. In the neural network, the gap between measured and random graph 
                                                 
5
 This is also known as the Six Degrees of Separation (Newman et al. 2002) 
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coefficient C is the smallest, the difference being “only” 0.231. Nonetheless, the difference between 
the measured and random graph clustering coefficients is very significant, as well as is the case with 
degree distributions of the real networks and random graphs (Newman 2002).  
 
3.2. Extensions of the basic random-graph models 
The basic random models capture the main idea of random network formation well but there are 
many shortcomings in the basic models and phenomena that random models fail to explain. The key 
motivation for the search of a well-fitting model is to provide a model that can be statistically 
estimated and still allows for specific dependencies between the probabilities whereby different links 
form (Jackson 2008b). Moving from static models to stochastic ones allows capturing both the 
regularities in the processes giving rise to network ties while at the same time recognizing that there 
is variability that one is unlikely to be able to model in detail (Robins et al. 2007). The network is 
usually conceptualized as a self-organizing system of relational ties. Substantively, the claim is that 
there are local social processes that generate dyadic relations, and that these social processes may 
depend on the surrounding social environment (i.e. on existing relations). For example, it is assumed 
that actors with similar attributes are more likely to form friendship ties (homophily), or that if two 
unconnected actors were connected to a third actor, at some point they are likely to form a 
friendship tie between them (transitivity) (Robins et al. 2007).  
 
There are a few modeling alternatives for the Erdös-Rényi (1959); e.g. Newman et al. (2002) fix the 
degree distribution of a random graph model in order to mimic the clustering and the degree 
properties of real-world networks, others include Barabási-Albert (1999) dynamic scale-free and 
Watts-Strogatz (1998) small world model. The basic random graph model of Erdös and Rényi (1959) 
is static; while all the variations of the basic model that I refer to exhibit dynamic features. Watts and 
Strogatz (1998) model of clustering and small-world phenomenon illuminates the dynamics as an 
explicit function of structure rather than for a few particular topologies. Also, Barabasi and Albert 
(1999) assume a nonstatic network with a growing number of vertices and preferential attachment. 
To account for the above mentioned homophily, Golub and Jackson (2009) have created a 
probabilistic multi-type random network. Transitivity, or more generally the assumption that nodes 
do not form independently is incorporated in the exponential random graph models, known as 
p*models, e.g. Wasserman and Pattison (1996).  
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3.2.1. A small-world model 
Watts and Strogatz (1998) generate a small-world model, a variation of a random network, where 
they show that only a small number of random links in a network are needed to generate a small 
diameter. They define small-world networks as having short paths and high clustering. Among Goyal 
et al. (2006) network G exhibits small-world properties if: (1) the number of nodes is very large  
compared with the average number of links, n>n(G) (2) the network is integrated; a giant component 
exists and covers a large share of the population. (3) The average distance between nodes in the 
giant component is small. (4) Clustering is high. Property (3) refers to short paths.  
Watts and Strogatz (1998) explore simple models where regular, nonrandom, networks are rewired 
to introduce increasing amounts on randomness, disorder. The rewiring procedure starts from a ring 
lattice with n vertices and k edges per vertex, then each edge is rewired at random with probability 
p. Watts and Strogatz (1998) quantify the structural properties of the graphs by their characteristic 
path length L(p) and clustering coefficient C(p). L(p) measures the typical separation between two 
vertices in the graph whereas C(p) measures the cliquishness of a typical neighborhood. A 
nonrandom regular lattice at p=0 (at p=0 network is regular and at p=1 it is completely random) is 
highly clustered large world where L grows linearly with n, whereas the random network at p=1 is 
poorly clustered, small world where L grows only logarithmically with n.  
 
Picture 5. Random rewiring procedure for 
interpolating between a regular ring lattice and 
a random network, without altering the 
number of vertices or edges in the graph. 
(Watts and Strogatz 1998) 
 
 
 
The small-world networks result from the immediate drop in L(p) caused by the introduction (as a 
result from the rewiring process) of a few long-range edges. These “short cuts” connect vertices that 
would be much farther apart in a random network. The important implication in Watts and Strogatz’s 
(1998) paper is the fact that an edge removed from a clustered neighborhood to make a short cut 
doesn’t change C(p) even though L(p) drops rapidly. Thus the transition to a small world is almost 
inevitable. Small-world phenomenon might be common in sparse networks with many vertices 
(Goyal et al. 2006) property (1) as only few short cuts are needed to make the network a small world. 
In a small world network information or diseases, for example, are predicted to spread much more 
easily and quickly. Random small-world networks allow for the quick spread of different flows, which 
could be thought as random phenomena, but the random small world network structure is much less 
suitable for enforcing cooperation between players. Watts and Strogatz (1998) find that for the 
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multi-player “Prisoner’s dilemma” played on a graph, as the fraction of short cuts increases, 
cooperation is less likely to emerge in a population of players using a generalized “tit-for-tat” 
strategy6. The likelihood of cooperative strategies evolving out of an initial cooperative/non-
cooperative mix also decreases with increasing p. This result is quite reasonable; as the randomness 
in a network increases the possibility for cooperative strategies for emerge decreases. Easley and 
Kleinberg (2009) propose that since the randomly connected nodes are completely unrelated 
assuming a heterogeneous network, they are hard for agents to use reliably. In fact, no trust 
between agents is likely to emerge. It seems that the structure of random networks enables poorly 
for cooperation, the social or economic networks allowing for cooperation are most probably likely 
to form strategically.  
 
3.2.2. Fixed degree distributions 
Another variation of a Poisson distributed random graph model which tries to account for the 
nonrandom social phenomena is a model by Newman et al. (2002) where the degree distribution is 
fixed. They are thus given the probabilities pk that a randomly chosen vertex in the network has a 
degree k. By fixing the degree distributions, one can avoid the problems with different degree 
properties of random and real networks. They take a number of vertices and assign to each a number 
k of “stubs” or ends of edges, where k is a random number drawn independently from the 
distribution pk for each vertex. The stubs are chosen randomly in pairs and joined up to form edges 
between the vertices. This will produce a graph with exactly the desired degree distribution. In 
calculating the properties of the emerged network Newman et al. (2002) apply a generating function 
G0(x) instead of using the degree distribution pk which is defined as 
𝐺0 𝑥 =  𝑝𝑘𝑥
𝑘 .
∞
𝑘=0
 
The model networks’ most striking property is that they exist in two different regimes. Depending on 
pk the networks either can consist of small clusters of vertices connected together by edges – 
components - or they may contain a giant component. If there is no giant component in a network, 
then all components are small and communication can only take place within small groups of people 
of typical size (s). If a giant component does exist, then a large fraction of the vertices in the network 
all can communicate with one another (and the number S is this fraction). (Newman et al. 2002) The 
degree distribution properties of networks thus determine how the information moves within a 
                                                 
6
 A tit-for-tat strategy plays the iterated prisoners' dilemma game by cooperating on the first move, and then 
making the same choice as the other player did on the previous move (Routledge Encyclopedia of International 
Political Economy 2001, edited by R. J. Barry). It was first introduced by Anatol Rapoport and Robert Axelrod 
aroun 1980.  
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network. Among Newman et al. (2002) almost all networks in society and nature seem to have a 
giant component; networks with no obvious giant component are rare.    
  
3.2.3. Preferential attachment 
Most of the existing random graph models fail to incorporate growth and preferential attachment. 
To eliminate the usual shortcomings, Barabási and Albert (1999) have created a model that 
generates scale-free networks using the assumption of preferential attachment and growth. In many 
large networks, the vertex connectivities follow a scale-free power-law distribution. The scale-free 
feature is due to the fact that networks expand continuously by the addition of new vertices, and 
new vertices attach preferentially to already well connected vertices. The initial difference in the 
connectivity between two vertices will thus increase further as the network grows. The older (smaller 
ti) vertices increase their connectivity at the expense of the younger (larger ti) ones, eventually 
leading to a setting where some vertices are highly connected. This kind of “rich-gets-richer” 
phenomenon can easily be found in real networks. Barabási and Albert (1999) study www sites and 
citation patterns and they show that the probability P(k) that a vertex in the network interacts with k 
other vertices decays as a power-law, following 𝑃 𝑘 ~ 𝑘−𝛾  . This indicates that large networks self-
organize into a scale-free state, a feature that is not present in any existing random network models. 
Also, in most real world networks the number of vertices increases throughout the lifetime of the 
network. In Erdös and Rényi (1959) and Watts and Strogatz (1998) model the probability of finding a 
highly connected vertex, a vertex with large k, decreases exponentially with k; vertices with large 
connectivity are nearly nonexistent. In contrast, the power-law tail characterizing P(k) in Barabasi 
and Albert (1999) indicates that highly connected vertices have a large chance of occurring.      
 
 
3.2.4. Homophilous networks 
One major shortcoming in the network literature is that most of the random and strategic form 
models fail to account for the pervasive fact that links in a social network tend to connect people 
who are similar to one another. One exception is the paper of Golub and Jackson (2008) who study 
how information transmission in various setting is affected by homophily7 which is observed almost 
universally in social networks. Homophily is defined as the tendency to associate with others with 
similar characteristics such as race, age, gender, and profession, religion and various behaviors 
(Golub and Jackson 2008) of which the latter three are defined as choice homophilous 
characteristics. 
                                                 
7
 See Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2007) for a friendship formation model based on a matching process that also 
introduces homophily. 
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Picture 6. Homophily can produce a 
division of a social network into 
densely-connected, homogeneous 
parts that are weakly connected to 
each other. Here, the different shades 
represent different races (Easley and 
Kleinberg 2009). 
 
A high degree of homophily in a network can have various consequences; especially affect the 
transmission of information. The influence mechanism of homophily in a network is for instance such 
that the information individuals learn from same-type individuals is more likely to be correlated with 
their own information, and that of different types is more likely to be uncorrelated. While the 
information flowing in a heterogeneous network might be more valuable, a same-type individual is 
easier to communicate with. This applies also to professional networks; individuals alike are easy to 
communicate with, but offer less creative synergy (Currarini et al. 2007). Consequently, homophily 
might in effect result in lower productivity and welfare.  
 
Golub and Jackson use a probabilistic multi-type random network model which generalizes the 
Erdös-Rényi random network model. Here, agents are divided into different types and the links are 
formed independently between various agents, with the probability of a link forming between two 
agents depending on the types of agents involved. They consider three different processes where the 
homophily in the network structure affecting diffusion turns out to depend on the type of learning or 
diffusion process. The two latter are affected by homophily whereas the first process is not. The first 
is the shortest path process where information is navigated to its destination via the shortest path, 
examples include many peer-to-peer systems like Internet and information spreading phenomena. 
The second is based on linear updating or learning where individuals update their beliefs or actions 
by repeatedly taking weighted averages of their neighbors’ beliefs or actions. The third, and the most 
interesting from my perspective, is a random walk process on a network, where some particle hops 
around the network, having equal probability of moving along any link out of its current node. The 
third process could fit well in modeling the diffusion of job information in reality where the particle 
could be thought e.g. as job information.  
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Here, the multi-type random network incorporating homophily is presented as follows. A network is 
represented via its adjacency matrix: a symmetric n-by-nmatrix A with entries in {0,1}, given the set 
of nodes 𝑁 = {1,… ,𝑛}. The interpretation is that 𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 𝐴𝑗𝑖 = 1 indicates that nodes i and j are 
linked, and the attention is restricted to undirected networks. Let 𝑑𝑖 𝑨 =  𝐴𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  denote the 
degree of node i. Let 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛  𝑨  and 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑨)  be the minimum and maximum degrees, respectively 
and 𝑑 (𝑨) denote average degree, and let 𝐷 𝑨 =   𝑑𝑖(𝑨)𝑖  be the total degree in the society. The 
actual multi-type random network consists of a vector 𝒏 = (𝑛1,… ,𝑛𝑚 ) which captures how many 
nodes of each type there are (and how many types, m, there are), and a symmetric m-by-m matrix P, 
whose entries in [0,1] describe the probabilities of links between various types. Let Nk be the set of 
nodes of type k, and label nodes so that {1,… ,𝑛1} are the nodes of the first type, {1 + 𝑛1 ,… ,𝑛1 +
𝑛2} are the nodes of the second type, and 𝑁𝑘 = {1 +  𝑛𝑖 ,… , 𝑛𝑖}𝑖≤𝑘𝑖<𝑘  are the nodes of the k-th 
type. The resulting random network is captured via its adjacency matrix which is denoted A(P, n) and 
is a random variable. A(P, n) is built by letting the entries Aij with  be independent Bernoulli random 
variables with parameter 𝑃𝑘𝑙 if 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘  and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑙 . That is, the entry 𝑃𝑘𝑙  captures the probability that 
an agent of type k links to an agent of type l.    
 
A special case of the model is an island model which also illustrates the random walk and linear 
updating model; this model is able to demonstrate the influence of homophily on the emerged 
networks more clearly. Thus, the nodes of the same type connect to each other with one probability 
and nodes of different types connect to each other with another probability.  
 
 
Golub and Jackson define two measures of homophily; the (unnormalized) homophily is defined as 
𝐻 =
𝑝𝑠
𝑝
 which captures how much more probable a link to a node of one’s own type is compared with 
other types. This varies between 0 and m, the number of islands. If a node only links to same-type 
nodes, then the average linking probability p becomes 
𝑝𝑠
𝑚  and so 𝐻 = 𝑚. If a node only links to the 
nodes of other types, then 𝑝𝑠 = 0 and naturally 𝐻 = 0. The normalized homophily, where the 
measure is divided by the number of islands m, is defined as 𝑕 =
𝑝𝑠
𝑚𝑝
. Thus, h is the fraction of a 
node’s links that are expected to be the agents of the same type.   
 
Golub and Jackson show that homophily affects the random graph and averaging process by possibly 
substantially slowing the process down whereas the shortest path process is unaffected. The 
slowdown is due to the fact that even though the average path length is unchanged, there are 
relatively fewer paths between the agents of different types as homophily increases. This result 
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indicates that homophily could have a significant effect also in the spread of job information within 
the network. If a network consists of homophilous components, the diffusion of information 
between the components would be very slow or non-existent which means that not everyone even 
inside the network is eligible to certain information. This could very well explain the “rich-gets-
richer” phenomenon. All in all, random models incorporating homophily find that there are both 
chance and choice involved in network formation. This approach is clearly a step away from 
complete randomness in network formation. 
 
3.2.5. Exponential random graph models 
Development of exponential random graph models is another approach to correct the assumption of 
independent link formation of the basic Bernoulli random graph distribution proposed by Erdös and 
Renyi (1959). The exponential models are known as p* models. The independency of edges is clearly 
an implausible assumption in almost all human social networks, but there are many factors affecting 
the pattern of link forming. Transitivity is one of the outstanding features that differentiate observed 
data from a pattern of random ties. It is expressed by a triadic closure; when there is a tie from i to j, 
and also from j to h, then there is a tie from i to h: “friends of my friends are my friends” (Snijders et 
al. 2006). There are several social processes which may give rise to transitivity. First, social ties may 
self-organize to produce triangular structures just as happens in the process shown above in Chapter 
2. Alternatively, certain actors may be very popular, and hence attract ties as is the case in the 
preferential attachment model of Barabási and Albert (1999). This process may result in core 
periphery network structure with popular actors in the core. In a separate third possibility, however, 
ties may arise because actors select partners based on attribute homophily, in which case triangles of 
similar actors may be a byproduct of a homophilous dyadic selection process. For a full 
understanding about the processes that give rise to and sustain the network, it is crucial to model 
transitivity adequately. Exponential random graph models offer the most promising framework 
within which such models including transitivity can be developed because these models allow for 
specific dependencies between the probabilities whereby different links form. (Snijders et al. 2006) 
 
To demonstrate conditional dependencies, Markov graph models have been introduced to real social 
networks. A Markov graph8 is a generalization of Poisson random graphs that has been useful in the 
                                                 
8
 Markov graphs derive from Markov chain. A Markov chain is a sequence of random variables X1, X2, X3…(all 
state transitions are probabilistic) with the Markov property that, given the present, the future is conditionally 
independent of the past. I.e. the description of the present state fully captures all the information that could 
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statistical analysis of observed networks. A Markov graph is also one form of exponential random 
graph but these models turn out to be not flexible enough to represent the degree of transitivity 
observed in social networks. The inflexibility stems from the fact that the Markov dependence 
assumption of Frank and Strauss (1986) is too strong and less strict conditional independence 
assumptions must be made (Snijders et al. 2006).  In addition, the Markov dependence seems 
unrealistic for large networks, where individual actors may not even be aware of each other and have 
no means to come into contact, yet their possible tie still is taken to influence other possible ties. 
Exponential random graph models that go beyond Markov random graphs include Wasserman and 
Pattison (1996), Pattison and Robins (2002) and Snijders (2002)9.     
 
Conditional dependencies can be established so that the probability of a link ik depends on whether 
ij and jk are present. Such dependencies tend to interact with one another in ways that could make it 
impossible to specify the probability of different graphs in a tractable manner (Wasserman and 
Pattison 1996). In positing an exponential random graph model five steps are implicitly followed. In 
step 1, each network tie is regarded as a random variable. In the model there is random variable Yij 
where Yij = 1 if there is a network tie from actor i to actor j, and where Yij = 0 if there is no tie. 
Notation yij is specified as the observed value of the variable Yij and Y is the matrix of all variables 
with y the matrix of observed ties, the observed network. In step 2, a dependence hypothesis is 
proposed, defining contingencies among the network variables. This hypothesis embodies the local 
social processes that are assumed to generate the network ties. In step 3, the dependence 
hypothesis implies a particular form to the model; well-specified dependence assumptions imply a 
particular class of models. In step 4, parameters are simplified through homogeneity or other 
constraints in order to reduce the number of parameters to be able to define the model more 
clearly. Finally, in step 5 model parameters are estimated and interpreted.  
The general form of the exponential random graph model is  
 𝑃 𝒀 = 𝒚 =
1
𝒌
exp⁡{ 𝜂𝐴𝑔𝐴(𝒚)}𝐴   
                                                                                                                                                        
influence the future evolution of the process. The transition probabilities of moving from a one state to another are 
dependent only upon the starting state of any transition, rather than upon how that state was reached (Diaconis 
2008) . Formally, Pr 𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑥 𝑋𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛 ,… ,𝑋1 = 𝑥1 = Pr 𝑋𝑛+1 =  𝑋𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛 .  
(http://mathworld.wolfram.com/MarkovChain.html/)  
 
9
 See Robins et al.(2007) and Snijders et al. (2006) for more discussion. 
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where ηA is the parameter corresponding to the configuration A,𝑔𝐴 𝒚 =  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑗𝜖𝐴   is the network 
statistic corresponding to configuration A and κ is a normalizing quantity which ensures that the 
equation is a proper probability distribution.  
 
 
 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
Poisson distributed static random graph models are a simple way to model theoretical random 
networks which do not demonstrate dynamic features. The model of Erdös and Rényi (1959) is 
perhaps most often referred to in the literature. In this model, nodes are connected by links 
independently with a probability p. The basic random graph models fail to demonstrate some 
features typical for real life social networks. Real life networks show strong clustering, a “small-
world” effect and they tend to have skewed degree distributions compared with the networks 
generated by random models. Therefore, there have been many attempts to improve the fit of the 
static random graph model for real networks in the literature. 
 
To sum up; a typical variation of the random graph model is a model with fixed degree distributions. 
By fixing the degree distribution this kind of model tries to mimic the degree distribution properties 
of the real networks. Newman et al. (2002) conclude that depending on the distribution their model 
networks can either consist of small clusters or they may contain a giant component. Even though in 
Newman et al. (2002) the degree distribution properties are the same as real networks they still are 
not able to model networks which would always show “small-world” properties. It must be that 
imitating degree properties does not substantially improve the fit of the model networks compared 
with real networks. Better fit is obtained through introducing dynamics, i.e. stochastic models.  
 
 
In Watts and Strogatz (1998) one of the key findings is that the transition to small-world networks is 
almost unavoidable. Small world networks have short paths and high clustering. With their dynamic 
rewiring process they have been able to better model the existing networks. The small world model 
of Watts and Strogatz (1998) illustrates dynamics as an explicit function of structure. The dynamics is 
present also in Barabási and Albert (1999) model, here; it is based on the assumption of growing 
networks (growing number of vertices) and preferential attachment. Thus, this model should avoid 
the shortcomings of the basic random graph models. The networks generated by the models feature 
scale-free properties, i.e. networks expand by the addition of new vertices and new vertices attach to 
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already well connected vertices. Contrary to Newman et al. (2002) and Watts and Strogatz (1998) 
models, highly connected sites are very likely to be found.  
 
Nonetheless, more often than not the links between nodes do not form independently which the 
basic random graph model does not account for, which is why the models do not manage to 
reproduce the characteristics of real networks. Golub and Jackson (2009) present the assumption of 
preferential attachment more explicitly by studying the effects of homophily in networks. Also, 
transitivity is another key feature present in real social networks which impacts greatly the structure 
of social networks.  
 
The Markov graph model allows for dependencies in real life networks but it still seems that the 
more nonrandom and more dynamic network the less precisely the static random graph models are 
able to model these networks. Markov graph dependence is a step to the right direction in 
formulating network formation but it imposes too strict and unrealistic dependencies. Robins et al. 
(2007) and Snijders et al. (2006) speak about exponential random graph models incorporating 
transitivity that move beyond Markov dependencies. Compared with other models presented here; 
these three papers assume conditional probabilities instead of total randomness, since both choice 
and chance that matters in network formation. Properly formulated assumptions enable including 
the choice also in the random models. Indeed, the merit of the papers is that they acknowledge that 
links do not form independently and develop the dependence assumptions beyond Markov graph 
dependencies.  
 
 
 
However, the fact that the formation of nonrandom networks is modeled with random graph models 
leaves the study of link formation somewhat one-sided. Random graph models and the variations do 
not model the network formation from the perspective of the nodes, i.e. players or agents, these 
models have more a planner’s view. That is, what Newman et al. (2002) call nonrandom social 
phenomena, which they try to take into consideration in their work, could be thought as individual 
incentives, willingness to form a link. To truly include the “nonrandom social phenomena” one has to 
change perspective, which leads to a strategic approach. By changing the perspective, one can 
actually account for the individual incentives in network formation while random models only 
recognize the fact that some links are more likely to form than others. However, I do not suggest that 
strategic form models could water tightly describe how networks form in real life, but they still bring 
a new standpoint into the discussion. Also, the focus of strategic form models is not so much on 
reflecting how well the models fit real social networks but rather on examining the stability and the 
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efficiency of the emerged networks. In addition, not all the job information is spread through weak 
links that are probably more likely to emerge through random models; therefore, strategic form 
models that I assume to produce stronger links should also be considered. Overall, it is worth noting 
that not all links form randomly and consequently, not all form strategically.  
 
In the next part I first study the network formation models in strategic form. 
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4. Strategic and game theoretic modeling of network 
formation 
Random graph models pursue to reproduce the properties of the real networks in the emerging 
model networks whereas the basis of strategic form models is the concepts of stability and efficiency. 
The structure of the real networks does not determine which links should form in the strategic form 
models, only the fact that a new link does not violate the conditions of stability and efficiency. 
Usually, the strategic approach models are categorized based on their notions of equilibrium; Jackson 
(2008a) calls the two approaches strategic and game theoretic models. The notion of pairwise 
stability is a feature of strategic models, whereas the basic Nash-equilibrium is present in the game 
theoretic models of network formation. The Nash equilibrium is more widely used even though 
pairwise stability would perhaps be more suitable in the context of networks.  
 
The strategic form network formation models are well represented in the literature. I limit the 
discussion to two main models, the ones of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000). 
 
4.1. Comparison of the random-graph and strategic networks  
The approach and the assumptions of random graph models are quite different from strategic form 
models. Contrary to strategic form models, random graph approach pay attention to the goodness of 
the fit so as to illustrate the existing social structure as well as possible. The papers about strategic 
form models concentrate on reflecting stability and efficiency of the network structure that the 
models produce, for instance, the whole model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is based on a stability 
test. Essentially, the approaches being so different, it might be that random graph models actually 
have more realistic assumptions about social networks than what strategic models do. Even though 
random graph models describe the link formation on a network level well, strategic models better 
describe networks where economic agents want to maximize their utility and where the motivation 
to form a link with another agent consists in the link enabling for cooperation. The focus in strategic 
form models is on examining the link formation on a single agent level.  
  
The difference between the two groups of network formation models could be expressed in terms of 
degree of activity of the agents in the formation process. As far as random graph models are 
considered, the links between nodes roughly just form without the consent of nodes or agents, they 
play a passive role in the process. Strategic models on the other hand demonstrate an active 
formation process, where forming or not forming certain links is a strategic decision for each utility 
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maximizing10, rational player forming them. That is, strategic form models enlighten the actual link 
formation process between individuals. As van den Nouweland (2004) defines, a network modeled 
by a strategic-form game11 is a collection of bilateral links between players who must establish and 
maintain their own links. From the economic point of view, the focal point in strategic models is the 
study of link formation between individuals. Most networks might however form randomly, thus the 
structure of the economy might be fundamentally defined by the random formation processes. 
Therefore, it is justified to include both models in this work.  
 
Nevertheless, when it comes to strategic form models, typically little is said about the factors 
affecting link formation, i.e. what are individuals’ motivations to form or not to form a link, what 
underlying triggers such as transitivity in random graph models contribute to the formation of a link. 
Here, it is sufficient to understand the principle how links between two players form in theory and to 
know that there are factors (such as presented in Chapter 2) affecting link formation. In other words, 
while random graph models take account some of the underlying factors that affect network 
formation such as homophily, i.e. some of the recent models acknowledge that links do not form 
independently, strategic form models tend to leave these factors aside or take them as given and 
speak about the principles of how links between players actually form. The emerged networks are 
then subject to the analysis of stability and efficiency from the economic point of view. 
 
4.1.1. Overview of the strategic form models 
The literature of network formation in strategic form is quite extensive and exploring here even the 
majority of the models would be too ambitious and would not serve the needs of this paper. The 
strategic form models can be divided into cooperative and noncooperative approach models; the 
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) being cooperative and Bala and Goyal (2000) a noncooperative model, I 
study both the models in this chapter. A cooperative game is a game where groups of 
players,”coalitions”, may enforce cooperative behaviour. Nash (1951) defines cooperative game as a 
situation involving a set of players, pure strategies, and payoffs “as usual”; but with the assumption 
that the players can and will collaborate. An example is a coordination game when players choose 
the strategies by a consensus decision-making process. Myerson (1991) defines game to be 
                                                 
10
 Maximizing utility or wealth does not imply that the incentives are rational in terms of money value, for 
example, especially when social network formation is considered. Agents do not necessarily maximize utility by 
simply calculating the payoffs and costs of forming a link but utility is much more implicitly determined. 
(Jackson 2008)    
 
11
 To define a game in strategic form, one needs to specify the set of players in the game, the set of options 
available to each player, and the way that players’ payoffs depend on the options that they choose (Myerson 
1991). 
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cooperative when players can negotiate effectively. In noncooperative games it is assumed that each 
player acts independently, without collaboration or communication with any of the others (Nash 
1951). 
 
To name a few earlier studies within this field, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) were the first 
to construct a cooperative theory of n-person games in coalitional form. Aumann and Drèze (1974) 
continue the coalitional approach and develop a solution concept generalizing several solution 
concepts developed earlier. Based on a cooperation structure introduced by Myerson (1977), 
Aumann and Myerson (1988) were the first to model network formation as a game in extensive form. 
Yet this model has not been widely used because it is not easily applicable beyond some simple 
examples.  
 
4.2. Strategic network formation model  
In recent years, different network formation procedures and network stability concepts have been 
proposed. There are principally three types of definitions of stability concepts, i.e. equilibrium: those 
definitions based on a pairwise stability notion, those based on the Nash equilibria of a link formation 
game, and those based on equilibria of a link formation game where transfers are possible. Here, I 
will be concentrating on the two first concepts of equilibrium. The whole picture of the different 
solution concepts is hard to decipher. For example, many models consider several notions of Nash 
equilibria in studying the possible equilibrium networks. Networks which are defined stable 
according to one solution concept are not stable among another concept; the connections between 
various solution concepts are rarely explicitly stated or even studied. (Bloch and Jackson 2006) I will 
analyze the issues of equilibrium, stability and efficiency in more detail later. 
 
In their paper, Jackson and Wolinsky propose a stability test for social networks – pairwise stability – 
which is a notion that applies directly to the network and player’s payoffs from networks (Bloch and 
Jackson 2006); the whole model of network formation builds on this stability test. In fact, the 
pairwise stability is introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The main idea in Jackson and 
Wolinsky’s (1996, 2006) models – the connections and the co-author model - is that the consent of 
both players is needed to form the link but a single player is able to sever the link. Jackson and 
Wolinsky (1996) have argued that the basic game theoretic model does not include communication 
and cooperation features but it may well be that an application of the basic model could be designed 
to take these features into account.  
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In Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) framework the value of a network can depend on exactly how agents 
are interconnected, not just who they are directly or indirectly connected to, thus the shortcoming of 
games with communication regarding to the network structure does not apply to the model of 
pairwise stability. The basic value functions and allocation rules are valid for the pairwise stability 
model. The value of a graph is represented by 𝑣: {𝑔|𝑔 ⊂ 𝑔𝑁} → ℝ. A graph 𝑔 ⊂ 𝑔𝑁  is strongly 
efficient if  𝑣 𝑔 ≥ 𝑣(𝑔′) for all 𝑔′ ⊂ 𝑔𝑁 . The term strong efficiency indicates maximal total value. 
Strong efficiency and Paretian efficiency are equivalent if value is transferable across players. An 
allocation rule 𝑌:  𝑔 𝑔 ⊂ 𝑔𝑁  × 𝑉 → ℝ𝑁 describes how the value associated with each network is 
distributed to the individual players. 𝑌𝑖(𝑔, 𝑣) is the payoff to player i from graph g under the value 
function v.  
 
The definition of a stable graph embodies the idea that players have the discretion to form or sever 
links. The formation of a link requires the consent of both parties involved, but the severance can be 
done unilaterally. Formally, this can be stated as follows: The graph g is pairwise stable with respect 
to v and Y if 
(i) for all 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑔, 𝑌𝑖 𝑔, 𝑣 ≥ 𝑌𝑖 𝑔 − 𝑖𝑗, 𝑣  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑗 (𝑔, 𝑣) ≥ 𝑌𝑗 (𝑔 − 𝑖𝑗, 𝑣) and 
(ii) for all 𝑖𝑗 ∉ 𝑔 if 𝑌𝑖(𝑔, 𝑣) < 𝑌𝑖 𝑔 + 𝑖𝑗, 𝑣  then 𝑌𝑗  𝑔, 𝑣 > 𝑌𝑗 (𝑔 + 𝑖𝑗, 𝑣)  
Condition (ii) embodies the assumption that, if i strictly prefers to form the link ij and j is just 
indifferent about it, then the link will be formed. The pairwise stability is a relatively weak notion 
among those which account for link formation and as such it permits a relatively larger set of stable 
allocations than might a more restrictive definition, such as Nash equilibrium, or an explicit 
formation procedure. However, a weak definition may provide strong results since it narrows the set 
of graphs substantially. 
 
Next I discuss two stylized versions of the general model of Jackson and Wolinsky, the connections 
and co-author model. There are various versions of the basic model that one could think of but these 
two models are meant to capture the basic issues arising in social and economic network.  
 
4.2.1. The Connections Model 
This example models social communication among individuals. Individuals directly communicate with 
those to whom they are linked. They also benefit from indirect communication from those to whom 
their adjacent nodes are linked. The value of communication obtained from other nodes depends on 
the distance to those nodes. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) also assume the communication to be 
costly thus the individuals must weigh the benefits of a link against its costs.  
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The utility of each player i from graph g is  
𝑢𝑖 𝑔 = 𝑤𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿
𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑤𝑖𝑗 −  𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑗 :𝑖𝑗 ∈𝑔
 
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 is the intrinsic value of individual j to individual i and cij is the cost to i of maintaining 
the link ij, tij is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting 𝑡𝑖𝑗 = ∞ if there is no 
path between i and j), and 0<δ<1 says that the value that i derives from being connected to j is 
proportional to the proximity of j to i. To sum, less distant connections are more valuable than more 
distant ones, but still, direct connections are costly. Here, the value of a graph is 
𝑣 𝑔 =  𝑢𝑖(𝑔)
𝑖∈𝒩
 
In this model, the exact link formation process is not costly but maintaining the link incurs costs – in 
the case of a friendship the costs could consist of e.g. phone calls, travel costs, opportunity costs of 
the time consumed to maintaining the link. 
By setting 𝑐𝑖𝑗 = 𝑐 for all ij and 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 1 for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 and 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 0 one gets a symmetric model. The 
unique strongly efficient network in the symmetric connections model is 
(i) the complete graph gN if 𝑐 < 𝛿 − 𝛿2 , 
(ii) a star12 encompassing everyone if 𝛿 − 𝛿2 < 𝑐 < 𝛿 + (
𝑁−2
2
))𝛿2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
(iii) no links if 𝛿 + (
𝑁−2
2
)𝛿2 < 𝑐 
Jackson and Wolinsky also examine the stability for the allocation rule 𝑌𝑖 𝑔 = 𝑢𝑖(𝑔) without side 
payments. The specification of no side payments might correspond best to a social network where by 
convention no payments are exchanged for friendship. I do not see the stability with side payments 
important to consider here because I believe that majority of job information spreads in networks 
that resemble friendship networks. In the symmetric connections model with 𝑌𝑖 𝑔 = 𝑢𝑖(𝑔) : 
(i) A pairwise stable network has at most one (non-empty) component. 
(ii) For  𝑐 < 𝛿 − 𝛿2, the unique pairwise stable network is the complete graph, gN. 
(iii) For 𝛿 − 𝛿2 < 𝑐 < 𝛿, a star encompassing all players is pairwise stable, but not 
necessarily the unique pairwise graph.  
(iv) For 𝛿 < 𝑐, any pairwise stable network which is non-empty is such that each player has 
at least two links and thus is inefficient. 
For proof, refer to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) p.51. 
 
                                                 
12
 The term star describes a component in which all players are linked to one central player and there are no other 
links: 𝑔 ⊂ 𝑔𝑁is a star if 𝑔 ≠ ∅ and there exists 𝑖 ∈  𝒩 such that if 𝑗𝑘 ∈, then either j=I or k=i. Individual i is the 
center of the star. 
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4.2.2. The Co-Author Model  
In this model, the players, or the nodes are researches who write papers. Each node’s productivity is 
a function of its links. A link represents collaboration between two researchers. Naturally, the 
amount of time a researcher spends on any given project is inversely related to the number of 
projects that researcher is involved in. As a result, in contrast to connections model, here indirect 
connections will enter the utility function in a negative way since they detract from one’s co-author 
time.  
The utility (or productivity) of player i given the network g is 
𝑢𝑖 𝑔 =  𝑤𝑖 𝑛𝑖 , 𝑗,𝑛𝑗  − 𝑐(𝑛𝑖)
𝑗 :𝑖𝑗 ∈𝑔
 
where 𝑤𝑖(𝑛𝑖 , 𝑗,𝑛𝑗 )  is the utility derived by i from a direct contact with j when i and j are involved in 
ni and nj projects, respectively, and c(ni) is the cost to i of maintaining ni links.  
A more specific version of this model is stated as 
𝑢𝑖 𝑔 =  [
1
𝑛𝑖
+
1
𝑛𝑗
+
1
𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑗 :𝑖𝑗 ∈𝑔
] = 1 +  1 +
1
𝑛𝑖
  
1
𝑛𝑗
𝑗 :𝑖𝑗 ∈𝑔
 
and for 𝑛𝑖 = 0,𝑢𝑖 𝑔 = 0. This form assumes that each researcher has a unit of time which they 
allocate equally across their projects. The output of each project depends on the total time invested 
in it by two collaborators, 1 𝑛𝑖 + 1 𝑛𝑗 ,   and some synergy in the production process captured by the 
term 1 𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑗 .  Here there are no direct costs of connection. The cost of connecting with a new author 
is that the new link decreases the strength of the interaction term with existing links.  
 
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) propose that in the co-author model:  
(i) if N is even, the strongly efficient network is a graph consisting of N/2 separate pairs, and  
(ii) (ii) a pairwise stable network can be partitioned into fully intraconnected components, 
each of which has a different number of members.  
Stable networks will tend to be over-connected from an efficiency perspective. This happens because 
authors only partly consider the negative effect their new links have on the productivity of the links 
with existing co-authors.  
 
4.2.3. Stability and efficiency 
A network resulting from Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996) model is deemed to be stable if  
(i) no individual agent has an incentive to sever a link and  
(ii) no pair of agents have an incentive to form a new link. 
Calvo-Armengol and Ilkiliç (2004) state that pairwise stable networks are robust to one-link 
deviations, where link severance is unilateral, while link creation is bilateral and under the mutual 
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consent of two involved players. Among Dutta and Jackson (2001) pairwise stability is a very weak 
concept of stability because it only considers the addition or deletion of a single link at a time. 
Therefore, it is not a sufficient condition for stability but usually it is considered a necessary condition 
for stability.  
 
4.3. Game theoretic network formation models 
Within the field of game theoretic models the cooperative approach models were first developed, 
but approximately from the end of the 1990s the focus of the researchers has shifted on the non-
cooperative models. The cooperative framework, especially games in characteristic form, did not 
prove entirely suited in games with externalities, i.e. virtually all games with genuine interaction 
among players (Marini 2007). This development is most probably due to the fact that the emphasis 
of research of networks has more or less shifted to more modern information transmission, buyer-
seller and virtual networks such as Facebook and Twitter, for example, where there are externalities 
and costs are not divided equally.  Non-cooperative models seem to be able to illustrate these kinds 
of networks where the cooperative approach fails to do so. Moreover, non-cooperative games are 
probably easier to analyze since many cooperative form games are reduced to non-cooperative form. 
I now present the noncooperative model of Bala and Goyal (2000).  
 
Game theoretic models are based on the Nash equilibrium. In the Nash-equilibrium, no player has 
any incentive to change his or her own strategy unilaterally, i.e. to form new links or to sever old 
ones. This means that in equilibrium no player can gain by altering the strategy chosen (Myerson 
1991). Dutta et al. (1997) define Nash equilibrium network so, that no agent wants to unilaterally 
break a link with any player. Because no player wants to break a link any cooperation structure can 
be sustained as Nash equilibrium. Consequently, no single player can form any new links through 
unilateral deviation, which among van den Nouweland (2004) motivates the use of Nash equilibrium 
for network formation models.  
 
 
4.3.1. One and two-sided link formation 
The model of Bala and Goyal (2000) was a pioneering one in the field of noncooperative game 
theoretic models13. This is mainly because their paper entails the dynamic approach which I present 
in the next chapter and they handle both one-sided and two-sided link formation. Many of the 
papers about network formation are concerned with the efficiency aspects of different network 
                                                 
13
 Although the model of one-sided and noncooperative link formation was introduced and some results on the 
static model were presented by Goyal (1993). 
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structures from the planner’s point of view (e.g. Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) while Bala and Goyal 
consider the subject from the perspective of individual incentives. Their approach builds on the 
notion that social networks are formed by individual decisions that trade off the costs of forming and 
maintaining links against the potential rewards from doing so.  
 
In Bala and Goyal’s setting, each individual is a source of benefits that others can tap via the 
formation of costly pairwise links. Benefits are assumed to be nonrival14; a link with another agent 
allows access to the benefits available to the latter via his own links. Thus individual links generate 
externalities whose value depends on the level of decay and delay associated with indirect links. I will 
just present the simple model where neither decay nor delay are accounted for. The cost of link 
formation is incurred only by the person who initiates the link, unlike in the Jackson and Wolinsky 
(1996) setting where costs are assumed to be symmetric across the players. This unsymmetric or at 
the extreme one-sided division of costs makes the network formation process a noncooperative 
game.  
 
A link between agent i and j can allow for either one-way (asymmetric) or the two-way (symmetric) 
flow of information. The former refers to a directed network whereas the latter to a nondirected 
network. The payoff is strictly increasing in the number of other people accessed (directly or 
indirectly) and strictly decreasing in the number of links formed. Each agent is assumed to possess 
some information of value to him and to other agents. He can augment this information by 
communicating with other people, which takes resources, time, and effort and is made possible via 
the setting up of pair-wise links.  
 
4.3.1.1.One-way Flow model 
Contexts where one individual may form a link with a second individual without the second 
individual’s consent include sending a paper to another individual or web links. Such settings 
obviously lead to different incentives in the formation of networks, as mutual consent is not needed 
(Dutta and Jackson 2001). In the one-way flow model the strategy profile is 𝑔 = (𝑔1 ,… ,𝑔𝑁) in 𝒢 as a 
directed network. The link 𝑔𝑖 ,𝑗 = 1 is represented by an edge starting at j with the arrowhead 
pointing at i. 𝑁𝑑 𝑖;𝑔 =  𝑘 ∈ 𝑁 𝑔𝑖 ,𝑘 = 1  is defined as the set of agents with whom i maintains a 
link. There is a path from j to i in g either if 𝑔𝑖 ,𝑗 = 1or there exist distinct agents 𝑗1 ,… , 𝑗𝑚  different 
from i to j such that 𝑔𝑖 ,𝑗1 = 𝑔𝑗1 ,𝑗2 = ⋯ = 𝑔𝑗𝑚 ,𝑗 = 1 . The notation “𝑗
𝑔
→ 𝑖” indicates that there exists a 
                                                 
14
 For example, information sharing, concerning brands or products among consumers, the opportunities 
generated by having trade networks and the important advantages arising out of social favors are examples of 
nonrival benefits.  
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path from j to i in g. In addition, 𝑁 𝑖;𝑔 =  𝑘 ∈ 𝑁 𝑘 → 𝑖 ∪ {𝑖} is the set of all agents whose 
information i accesses either through a link or through a sequence of links.  
In one-way flow, the payoff function to each agent is denoted as 
Π𝑖 𝑔 = Φ 𝜇𝑖 𝑔 , 𝜇𝑖
𝑑 𝑔   which can be put as Π𝑖 𝑔 = 𝜇𝑖 𝑔 − 𝜇𝑖
𝑑 𝑔 𝑐. 
here 𝜇𝑖 𝑔  is the number of agents observed by the agent i which can thus be interpreted as the 
benefit to agent i. Notion 𝜇𝑖
𝑑 𝑔  is the number of agents with whom i has formed links and measures 
the cost associated with maintaining them.  
 
4.3.1.2. Two-way flow model 
A nondirected network is denoted 𝑔 = 𝑐𝑙(𝑔), and defined by 𝑔𝑖 ,𝑗 , = max⁡(𝑔𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑔𝑗 ,𝑖) for each i and j 
in N. There is a two-way path in g between i and j if either 𝑔𝑖,𝑗 , = 1 or there exist agents 𝑗1 ,… , 𝑗𝑚  
distinct from each other and i and j such that 𝑔𝑖 ,𝑗1 = ⋯ = 𝑔𝑗𝑚 ,𝑗 = 1. The notion 𝑖
𝑔
 𝑗 indicates a 
two-way path between i and j in g. 𝑁𝑑 𝑖;𝑔 is defined as in one-way model. The payoffs are  
Π𝑖 𝑔 = Φ 𝜇𝑖 𝑔 , 𝜇𝑖
𝑑 𝑔   and  Π𝑖 𝑔 = 𝜇𝑖 𝑔 − 𝜇𝑖
𝑑 𝑔 𝑐 where upper bar denoted the nondirected 
network. 
This definition of payoffs means that while one agent bears the cost of a link, both agents obtain the 
benefits associated with it. Examples of two-way information flow with asymmetric cost division 
include phone call.  
4.3.1.3. Emerging networks 
Simply put, agent i’s payoff is the number of agents he observes less the total cost of link formation. 
The payoff function implicitly assumes that the value of information does not depend upon the 
number of individuals through which it has passed, that is, there is no information decay or delay in 
transmission15. The payoff is strictly increasing in the number of other people accessed and strictly 
decreasing in the number of links formed. If 𝑐 ∈ (0,1), then agent i is willing to form a link with agent 
j for the sake of j’s information alone. When 𝑐 ∈  1,𝑛 − 1  agent i requires j to observe some 
additional agents to induce him to form a link with j. When 𝑐 > 𝑛 − 1, the cost of link formation 
exceeds the total benefit of information available; here, the dominant strategy for i is not to form 
any links at all.  
 
                                                 
15
 See Bala and Goyal (2000) p. 1210 for details about he models with decay and delay. 
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Bala and Goyal (2000) find that Nash networks are either minimally connected or empty. In the one-
way flow model, the only strict Nash architectures are the wheel and the empty network16. A strict 
Nash network is one where each agent gets a strictly higher payoff with his current strategy than he 
would with any other strategy.   
 
Given the payoff function, the wheel is the unique strict Nash if 𝛷 𝑥 + 1, 𝑥  > 𝛷(1,0) for some 
𝑥 ∈ {1,… ,𝑛 − 1}. If 𝛷 𝑥 + 1, 𝑥 < 𝛷(1,0) for all 𝑥 ∈ {1,… ,𝑛 − 1} and 𝛷 𝑛, 1 > 𝛷(1,0) then 
empty network and the wheel are both strict Nash. If 𝛷 𝑥 + 1, 𝑥 < 𝛷(1,0)  holds for all 𝑥 ∈
{1,… ,𝑛 − 1} and 𝛷 𝑛, 1 < 𝛷(1,0) then the empty network is the unique strict Nash. 
 
 
 This result underlines a general 
property of Nash network when 
agents are symmetrically positioned 
in relation to information and costs 
of access: in equilibrium, either 
there is no social communication or 
every agent has access to all the 
information in the society. If the 
network is not minimally 
connected, then some agent could 
delete a link and still observe all agents, which would contradict Nash.  
 
In the two-way model, the asymmetry in payoffs referred to earlier is relevant to defining the 
architecture of the network. Here, there are three types of star networks, depending upon which 
agents bear the costs of the links in the network. The three types of star networks are center-
sponsored, periphery-sponsored and a mixed type star. Also, there can be a large number of Nash 
equilibria. However, strict Nash network architectures are either center sponsored star and the 
empty network.  
A center sponsored star is strict Nash if and only if 𝛷 𝑛,𝑛 − 1 > 𝛷(𝑥 + 1, 𝑥) for all 𝑥 ∈
 0,… ,𝑛 − 2 . The empty network is strict Nash if and only if 𝛷 1,0 > 𝛷 𝑥 + 1, 𝑥  for all 𝑥 ∈
{1,… ,𝑛 − 1}.  
 
 
Some critique towards the model has also been suggested: the fact that no consent for link 
formation is required is unacceptable for social networks. Also, applications are reputedly very 
                                                 
16
 A wheel network (see Picture 4) is such where the agents are arranged as {𝑖1 ,… , 𝑖𝑁} with 𝑔𝑖2 ,𝑖1 = ⋯ =
𝑔𝑖𝑛 ,𝑖𝑛−1 = 𝑔𝑖1 ,𝑖𝑛 = 1 and there are no other links. Bala and Goyal denote the wheel network as g
w
. A star 
network has a central agent i such that 𝑔𝑖 ,𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗 ,𝑖 = 1 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁\{𝑖} and no other links.   
Picture 7. Strict Nash networks, one-way model (n=4). (Bala and 
Goyal 2000) 
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limited; links have to be viewed as the confirmations of existing relationships, e.g. one of the agents 
already linked to each other makes a phone call and bears the costs. Furthermore, the payoff 
functions investigated are rather unrealistic. Yet, the one-sided link formation could describe the way 
in which part of the virtual links in social networking sites are formed. For example, people in Twitter 
might follow tweets of some particular user without sender’s consent if s/he has allowed open 
access. Here, the link is obviously one-sided.   
 
 
4.3.2. Stability and efficiency 
In Bala and Goyal’s model a complete graph is never efficient or stable due to the noncooperative 
approach. Let 𝑔−𝑖  denote the network obtained when all of agent i's links are removed. The network 
g can be written as 𝑔 = 𝑔𝑖⨁𝑔−𝑖where the ⊕ indicates that g is formed as the union of the links in gi 
and g-i . The set of agent i’s best responses to 𝑔−𝑖  is denoted 𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑔−𝑖). Furthermore, a network 
𝑔 =  𝑔1 ,… ,𝑔𝑛  is a Nash network if𝑔𝑖 ∈ 𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑔−𝑖) for each i.  
The welfare measure W(g) is defined in terms of the sum of payoffs of all agents. A network is 
efficient if 𝑊(𝑔) ≥ 𝑊(𝑔′) for all 𝑔′ ∈ 𝒢. The corresponding welfare function for two-way 
communication is denoted 𝑊. For the linear payoffs, an efficient network is one that maximizes the 
total value of information made available to the agents, less the aggregate cost of communication. 
 
Bala and Goyal find that if the cost of forming links is low or if the network is highly reliable then 
there is no conflict between efficiency and stability (Dutta and Jackson 2001).With the two-way 
flows, the subject of efficiency is quite complex. For example, a center-sponsored star can have a 
different level of welfare than a periphery-sponsored one, since the number of links maintained by 
each agent is different in the two networks. However, given the linear payoffs, it can be shown that if 
𝑐 ≤ 𝑛 a network is efficient if and only is it is minimally two-way connectected (a star is efficient) 
while if 𝑐 > 𝑛 then the empty network is uniquely efficient (Bala and Goyal 2000).  
 
4.4. Discussion about the different equilibrium concepts 
Pairwise stability and Nash equilibrium have very dissimilar approaches. Pairwise stability applies 
directly to the network and players’ payoffs from networks. However, in most of the game theoretic 
models, such as in a noncooperative linking game (e.g. Myerson 1991) agents independently 
announce which bilateral links they would like to form and then standard game-theoretic equilibrium 
concepts can be used to make predictions about which networks will form. Many examples show 
that the set of the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the linking game can be completely different from 
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the set of pairwise stable networks (Bloch and Jackson 2006). In addition, the connections between 
various solution concepts are rarely explicitly stated or studied (Bloch and Jackson 2006). 
 
The concept of Nash equilibrium is perhaps most commonly applied to measure the stability in 
strategic form models of network formation albeit it might be that pairwise stability is more intuitive 
and suits better to describe the stability of social networks. Both notions of stability do have their 
strengths and weaknesses.   
 
Pairwise stablility is not based on an explicit noncooperative game of network formation. Instead, it 
is a direct stability check which rules out networks which can intuitively be considered as unstable. 
Pairwise stability is a simple concept to use in applications because it has good computational 
properties. The fact that it only considers very simple deviations is its main shortcoming, and a 
network may be classified as stable too easily. Central to the notion of pairwise stability is the fact 
that a deviation can include two players who come together to form a new link. The concept of Nash 
equilibrium does not allow for such consideration but it sees players as individuals who do not 
cooperate, this thus holds for noncooperative models (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). Nevertheless, as 
Dutta and Jackson (2001) and the authors of the paper themselves have criticized the model, the 
basic stability notion of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) requires only that a network is immune to one 
deviating action at a time. That is, it is not required that a network be immune to more complicated 
deviations, such as a simultaneous severance of some existing links and introduction of a new link by 
two players. It is not required either that a network is unaffected to deviations by more than two 
players simultaneously. In fact, Jackson and Wolinsky admit that the notion of pairwise stability does 
not even contemplate the severance of more than one link by a single player. The consequence of 
strengthening the stability notion so to allow for more complex deviations is the fact that in some 
cases there may not exist any stable network.  
 
Unlike the pairwise stability notion, the concept of Nash equilibrium fails to account for the fact that 
value of a network can depend on how the players in a network are interconnected. This is basically 
implicit in the Jackson and Wolinsky model but to my knowledge this has not been incorporated to 
the game theoretic models. Considering how the value depends on the pattern of connectedness 
might have substantial effect which networks are considered as efficient. Jackson (2008a) argues that 
the noncooperative game Nash equilibrium fails to model the network formation because it does not 
take cooperation and communication between the players into consideration. Usually, the network 
formation games may have too many Nash equilibria of which many are easily seen as unreasonable, 
such as empty networks, regardless of the networks. In other words, Nash equilibrium allows players 
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to refuse to form links and thus effectively delete links, but as Jackson (2008b) argues that it does not 
capture the fact that it may be mutually advantageous to form a relationship. 
  
To address the fact that the consent of both players is needed to form a link, that an undirected 
network do not account for, one should consider coordinated actions on the part of pairs of players. 
This is the motivation behind pairwise stability (Jackson 2008b). To be able to explore changes 
beyond one link at a time, one needs to come up with a revision of a stability concept. One useful 
refinement of both the set of pairwise stable networks and Nash equilibrium of the linking game 
called pairwise Nash equilibrium is exactly the intersection of the set of the Nash equilibrium 
outcomes of the linking game and the set of pairwise stable networks, when such networks exist 
(Bloch and Jackson 2006). Pairwise Nash stability thus combines pairwise stability and Nash 
equilibrium. A rational network is one that is both Nash stable and pairwise stable, i.e. a network is 
pairwise Nash stable if it is both Nash and pairwise stable (Calvo-Armengol and Ilkiliç 2004). 
 
In the next chapter, I will develop the fundamental models further and discuss some extensions of 
the strategic form models that introduce dynamics, heterogeneity across players and endogenous 
link strength.  
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5. Other game theoretic models of network formation 
Thus far, the strategic form networks have demonstrated static features. In this part, I discuss models 
introducing dynamics, heterogeneous players and models where link strength is defined 
endogenously. None of these modifications is present in labor market models with the network 
approach as such but the assumptions in the extensions in this chapter are more similar to the labor 
market models and above all, more realistic than the ones in the basic Jackson and Wolinsky and Bala 
and Goyal model. The lack of these assumptions might be due to the fact that Calvó-Armengol (2004) 
seems to be the only one who has even succeeded in creating an endogenous network formation 
model in labor labor information networks. Yet, all the labor market models have several – or at least 
two – periods, thus understanding dynamics in network formation is useful. Also, unlike many basic 
labor market theories, such as search theory, the network approach assumes heterogeneous 
employees; that is why I speak about applications with heterogeneous players. The lack of 
complicated models can be explained by a rather short lifespan of this field of research, or because 
simpler models are able to adequately explain the phenomena in question. It is most probably true 
that the more complex model the less explanatory power it has. Nevertheless, I believe that the 
assumptions of heterogeneous agents and endogenous link strength should be included in the 
endogenous network formation model.  
 
5.1. Dynamic models 
By understanding the dynamic process of network formation one might be able to better predict the 
impact of certain acts. The economy – i.e. economic actors - is not in a static state but the structure 
evolves and changes over the time (Easley and Kleinberg 2009); agents are assumed to be farsighted. 
Also, most of the labor market models with the network approach have two or more periods. 
 
The study of dynamics in network formation is the second contribution among one-sided link 
formation in Bala and Goyal’s (2000) paper. Other papers discussing dynamic models include that of 
König, Tessone and Zenou (2009)17. The research of dynamics is justified by the fact that they believe 
that dynamics may help select among different equilibria of the static games. Bala and Goyal use 
best-response dynamics to study the issue; an individual chooses a set of links that maximizes his 
payoffs given the network of the previous period. The network formation game is assumed to be 
repeated in each period t=1,2,...In the model there is some fixed probability 𝑟𝑖 ∈ (0,1) agent i to 
                                                 
17
 In the model of König et al. (2009) links are formed on the basis of agents’ centrality (Bonacich centrality) 
while the network is exposed to a volatile environment introducing interruptions in the connections between 
agents. They show that there exists a unique stationary network whose topological properties match features 
exhibited by real-world networks. There exists a sharp transition in efficiency and network density from highly 
centralized to decentralized networks. 
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exhibit inertia, i.e. individual chooses the same strategy as in the previous period. Inertia is not 
expressed with probability 𝑝𝑖 = 1 − 𝑟𝑖 ; then an agent chooses a myopic pure strategy best response 
to the strategy of all other agents in the previous period. Also, if more than one strategy is optimal, 
an agent randomizes across the optimal strategies.  
 
Formally, the dynamic model is presented as follows. For a given set A, Δ(𝐴) denotes the set of 
probability distributions on A. For each agent i there exists a number 𝑝𝑖 ∈ (0,1) and a function 
𝜙𝑖 :𝒢 → Δ(𝒢𝑖) where 𝜙𝑖  satisfies, for all 𝑔 = 𝑔𝑖⨁𝑔−𝑖 ∈ 𝒢: 
 𝜙𝑖(𝑔) ∈ Interior Δ(𝐵𝑅𝑖 𝑔−𝑖 ),  
For 𝑔 𝑖  in the support of 𝜙𝑖(𝑔) the notation 𝜙𝑖 𝑔 (𝑔 𝑖) denotes the probability assigned to 𝑔 𝑖  by the 
probability measure 𝜙𝑖 𝑔 . If the network at time 𝑡 ≥ 1 is 𝑔
𝑡 = 𝑔𝑖
𝑡⨁𝑔−𝑖
𝑡  , the strategy of agent i at 
time t+1 is assumed to be given by 
𝑔−𝑖
𝑡  
𝑔 𝑖 ∈ 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝜙𝑖 𝑔                                 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑖 × 𝜙𝑖 𝑔 (𝑔 𝑖)
𝑔𝑖
𝑡                                                 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 − 𝑝𝑖
  
 
The equation states that with probability 𝑝𝑖 ∈ (0,1) agent i chooses a naive best response to the 
strategies of other agents. The function 𝜙𝑖defines how agent i randomizes between best responses if 
more than one exists. Additionally, with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑖agent i maintains his previous strategy. 
Bala and Goyal assume that the choice of inertia as well as the randomization over best responses by 
different agents is independent across agents. The dynamic process in the two-way model is the 
same except that the best- response mapping is denoted 𝐵𝑅    𝑖(∙) instead of 𝐵𝑅𝑖(∙).  
 
Bala and Goyal (2000) suggest that the dynamic process converges to a limit network. In the one-way 
flow model, for any number of agents, the dynamic process converges to a wheel or to the empty 
network, with probability 1. In the two-way flow model, the dynamic process converges to a center-
sponsored star or to the empty network with probability 1.  
 
 
 
 
5.2. Endogenous link strength and heterogeneity across agents 
Nearly all formal models of networks treats links as binary quantities, i.e. they are either present or 
absent, which is clearly a simplification of the networks observed in reality. Relationships are 
characterized not only by the presence or absence of a link but also by the intensity, frequency or 
reliability whereby they occur (Rogers 2005). Bloch and Dutta (2008) analyze the link formation in 
communication networks when players choose how much to invest in each relationship, where the 
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quality of links is endogenously chosen by the agents. Most of the models assume the strength of the 
link to be exogenously given. The paper of Bloch and Dutta is one of the first to address to the 
strength of links. This issue has been studied in the field of sociology earlier; Granovetter (1973) has 
examined the strength of the weak ties, links, and one of his conclusions is that job information is 
more likely to transmit through weak than strong links. Rogers (2005) introduces heterogeneity 
across agents because the utility of links depends not only on the amount of links an agent has but 
also who the acquaintances are. 
 
5.2.1. Link strength as an endogenous variable 
 The fact that Bloch and Dutta consider link strength as endogenously chosen by the players can 
make this model useful starting point from the labor market perspective –given that the strength of 
the link is a significant factor in getting job information. Intuitively thought, the strength of a link 
should have a considerable effect on the quality of the information and the speed at which it 
transmits. The impact could be somewhat the same as in the case of homophilous networks. That is, 
the information between same-type agents is more likely to be correlated and therefore the 
information flow between different-type agents ought to be more valuable. Here, players perhaps 
choose to form strong links with agents with similar characteristics and weak links with players that 
distinct from themselves. Therefore, the information such as job information transmitted through 
weak links might be more valuable in comparison with strong links. In other words, the players who 
are connected with a strong link are more likely to possess similar information and thus, also less 
new job information tends to spread through strong links. Then again, the flow of information 
between weak links might be slower compared to that of strong links. 
 
The strength of a social link in social networks depends on the frequency and the length of social 
interactions. The model is a generalization of Bala and Goyal’s (2000) one-sided, two-way flow model 
of link formation (later they also cover the Jackson and Wolinsky 1996 setting). Each individual has a 
total resource (time, money) X > 0 and has to decide on how to allocate it in establishing links with 
others. The assumption of agents facing a fixed cost in the formation of links leads Bloch and Dutta 
(2009) to specify the strength of a link as an additively separable and convex function of agents’ 
investments. 
Let 𝑥𝑖
𝑗
denote the amount of resource invested by player i in the relationship with j. The strength of 
the relationship is then denoted 
𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝜙 𝑥𝑖
𝑗
 + 𝜙(𝑥𝑗
𝑖)  
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where 𝜙(. ) is a nondecreasing, convex function. The separability of the function implies that an 
agent’s decision to allocate his endowment over direct links is independent of his neighbors’ 
decisions; however, these choices affect the value of indirect links so agent’s investment strategy is 
not independent of the choices of other agents. 
 
Also Bloch and Dutta themselves admit that one obvious drawback in their analysis is the fact that 
agents are homogenous. This assumption leads to the conclusion that links will all be of the same 
quality (with linear investments) or some agents will be better connected than others due to the 
hub’s investments (convex investments). Neither the distributions of link intensities do justice to the 
broad array of social networks observed in reality, and as such do not demonstrate the idea of strong 
and weak links. Rogers (2005) introduces heterogeneity across players.    
 
5.2.2. Heterogeneous agents – asking and giving model 
Exploring models with heterogeneous agents is relevant in the labor information networks. For 
instance, some people are more likely to pass on job offers because of their professional contacts 
(Rogers 2005). In other words, some aspects of what a person has to offer depend on who their 
acquaintances are and not just on the amount of links a person has. Therefore, Rogers (2005) 
introduces heterogeneity across agents’ intrinsic qualities and across linking costs. Asymmetries 
between players are natural; some players may be more productive or more informed compared 
with others. In the search theoretic labor market models the players are typically homogenous 
whereas the labor market theory with network approach builds to heterogeneous agents; there are 
both low-skilled and high-skilled workers. In addition to Rogers, Galeotti and Goyal (2002) discuss a 
model with heterogeneous agents. Their model is very much like the one of Rogers (2005) except the 
flow of information is two way and link strength is given. 
 
In the asking and giving model Rogers (2005) combines endogenous link strength with 
heterogeneous players; the characteristics of agents are allowed to vary along two dimensions – 
intrinsic qualities and linking costs. The model is a one-way flow model like Bala and Goyal’s (2000) 
with the exception that Rogers separates the flow of benefits into asking and giving models, that is, 
the one-way flow of benefits or information can be in both directions but not at the same time. This 
pattern of diffusion could fit quite well to the way job information is transmitted; when an employed 
agent decides to give job information, strictly speaking only the receiving agent benefits (omitting 
the possible benefit or gratification the giving agent receives), thus the flow of benefits is not two 
way.  
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The asking model is such that an unemployed agent asks about vacant jobs from his or her 
connections. In this model, agents are endowed with publicly observed intrinsic qualities, or value 
measured in terms of quality of information they possess 𝛼 =  𝛼1 ,… ,𝛼𝑛 ∈ ℝ+
𝑛  and linking budgets 
𝛽 = (𝛽1 ,… ,𝛽𝑛) with 0 < 𝛽𝑖 < 1 for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, which are the sources of heterogeneity across 
agents. The difference in linking budgets stems from the fact that some agents have more social 
interest or ability, and thus naturally form stronger links to others. In the asking model, given the 
linking choices and intrinsic values of others, agent i chooses the relative amounts of benefits to 
receive from others from her budget of resources. In the giving model agent chooses how to give 
benefit given the linking choices of all others. The benefit from a link thus depends on the value of 
the agent linked to and the strength of the link. Additionally, the value of the agent depends on its 
set of links and the values of its neighbors, and so forth18.  
 
These modifications give new insights into the question of efficiency and stability. In the giving model 
there are differences between Nash and efficient networks which arises under heterogeneous 
budgets because for efficiency, linking choices are determined by total connectivities, whereas the 
equilibrium choices depend on individual connectivities. The discrepancy between equilibrium and 
efficiency is not present in the asking model, however. Also, in the giving model the linking choice of 
individuals is independent of the intrinsic values of other agents only the strength of the paths seems 
to matter. Neither asking nor giving model produces networks with wheel structures in equilibrium. 
A star network, on the other hand, is always efficient in the asking model when it forms. In the giving 
model star is never efficient because stars only form when budgets are not homogeneous; in this 
model, the empty network is Nash for budgets of every size. The equilibrium networks between the 
two models differ in that Galeotti and Goyal (2002) model’s strict Nash network is a minimal network 
where every component with three or more players is a center-sponsored star.  
 
Center-sponsored star architecture plays a prominent role even in the presence of heterogeneous 
values and differences in the cost of forming links across players (Galeotti and Goyal 2002). The star 
network is indicative of the role of the “hubs” in real life networks, where a few nodes have many 
connections. The occurrence of hubs has important implications for network performance, mainly 
due to their role in decreasing the distances between nodes in the network (Rogers 2005).  
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Formally, let 𝑣𝑖  denote the (endogenously) determined component of i’s utility derived from her relations in 
the network 𝑓(Φ) so that I’s total utility is 𝑢𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 . In model asking, 𝑣𝑖 =   𝛼𝑗 + 𝑣𝑗  𝑓 𝜙𝑖𝑗  𝑗 , whereas in 
model giving 𝑣𝑖 =   𝛼𝑗 + 𝑣𝑗  𝑓 𝜙𝑗𝑖  𝑗 . Here, 𝑓 𝜙𝑖𝑗   denotes the intensity of the directed link ij.  
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5.3. Discussion 
I have tried to concentrate on the models that are relevant from the labor market and information 
flow perspective, trying to identify factors that are the most important in the formation of social 
networks that should be included in the models. Obviously, there is a large body of work in 
economics which examines the game theoretic modelling of network formation with various 
assumptions and contexts. Presenting even all the types of the extensions is beyond the scope of this 
work. Of the models presented above the dynamic formation model is perhaps the most central 
because agents are farsighted and optimize beyond one period. It is important to see to which 
structure the network convergences because it essentially affects labor market dynamics; static 
models fail to consider this aspect altogether.  
 
To conclude, I name a few examples of the models that I consider important which were not 
discussed above. One class of applications is such that introduces link formation with costs, e.g. 
Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001) though applying only to cooperative form models. Networks 
also enable the trading of many goods, i.e. the trading happens in networks of buyers, seller and 
some third party actors, and these trading networks are thus important for the overall economic 
outcome. Kranton and Minehart’s (2000) model of buyer-seller networks is perhaps the most 
prominent in the literature. One typical modification of the basic game theoretic model is link 
formation with transfers or side payments, e.g.  Bloch and Jackson 2006, which essentially stand for 
the same thing. I believe that when links in a social networks form, no side payments are made; side 
payments could be the means when a social planner wishes for a certain network structure to 
emerge. The models that I have presented here all assume perfect information, meaning that 
individuals are aware of the structure of the network. Assuming perfect information in linking 
decisions might not be feasible in all cases, one valuable modification of Galeotti et al. (2009) 
introduce network formation game with imperfect information where the level of information 
shapes individual behavior and payoffs.   
 
 
I have now discussed network formation and presented several models of network formation with 
different assumptions. In the next part, I turn to analyze some effects that networks have on the 
economy. In other words, I will deliberate how one can explain certain phenomena of the networked 
labor markets with network approach. Here, I will compare theories with the network approach to 
other widely applied economic theories. 
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6. Networks and labour markets 
Understanding the role of networks in various settings is very central; a particularly relevant topic in 
the economic research is the study of the effect of social networks in in labor markets.  Job markets 
are typically characterized by asymmetric information on job opportunities and workers’ ability  
(Goyal 2007). Having more or better connections may allow individuals to receive more information 
on vacancies since access to information is heavily influenced by social structure (Ioannides and 
Loury 2004). The network pattern of relationships is important as it describes who passes 
information to whom, which is ultimately crucial in determining a person’s long-term employment 
prospects (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2004). During last decade, these issues have been rather 
widely recognized in the literature. In essence, the topics “volatility” of unemployment and inequality 
measured in terms of wage and dropout rate differentials in the labor market are for the most part 
the motivation and the main focus of this chapter.  
 
In this part, I also compare the explicative power of search theoretic and network approach 
regarding the trends prevailing in the labor markets. In other words, my aim is to show if network 
approach can possibly provide a better theory for the persistence of unemployment and wage 
differences between groups. Overall, the network approach does not strive for undermining search 
or matching model but it offers and additional explanation to phenomena that search approach is 
thought not to be able to account for. Here I presume that network approach provides a more valid 
theory to the phenomena in question compared with search theory. In effect, the papers with 
network approach show how network considerations imply different outcomes than the simple one-
to-one search models that typify most economic analyses of job acquisition. Still, it remains unclear 
whether e.g. duration dependence is due to unobserved heterogeneity or the network structure of 
the economy. For the time being, the position of the network approach in the field of research is 
validated because it offers at least a complimentary explanation to these questions. 
 
I first introduce the search and matching model to provide the basic understanding about labor 
market models. Thereafter I discuss labor market models with the network approach and about the 
fact how certain features of labor markets are explained by the network approach. Now, I shortly 
discuss the characteristics of networked labor markets.  
 
6.1. Characteristics of networked labor markets 
During the last few decades, there have been many developments in the field of labor economics. 
The means how labor economics seeks to understand the functioning and dynamics of labor markets 
has shifted from neoclassical supply and demand models towards search and matching theory and 
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beyond. Yet, the search and matching framework has been criticized for being unable to match key 
labor market statistics, namely the volatility of unemployment (variation in unemployment duration) 
and job vacancies. This casts doubt on the viability of the search and matching model to provide a 
theory for labor market dynamics (Lubik 2009). Now there is a move towards labor market models 
with the network approach because standard economic analysis does not account for the role of 
social networks in the employment process and is hence unable to explain certain persisting 
phenomena in labor markets. This view states that informal hiring channels such as job search 
through networks are important for both workers and employers and consequently, the pattern of 
social ties between individuals may play an important role in determining the labor market outcomes 
(Montgomery 1991). 
 
Labor markets are characterized e.g. by wage and employment status differentials between various 
groups of individuals, between men and women, different races and ethnic groups, the older and 
younger and people with a different educational background. Among Stovel and Fountain (2006) the 
classical explanations for segregation in labor markets in the demand side are employer preferences 
for-or against particular groups of workers (blacks, women, immigrants) and in supply side difference 
in skill level between groups and difference in preferences to workers for types of jobs. If this was the 
sole reason, there would  still be to explain why the characteristics of different groups should differ. 
However, which people are hired into which jobs does not depend only on individual and human 
capital characteristics of workers or the preferences of 
employers; it is also a function of the complex process 
by which people and jobs hear about and are matched 
with one another (Granovetter 1981).  
 
Thus, social networks are an important means in 
acquiring a job; Montgomery (1991) states that 
approximately 50 percent of all workers currently 
employed found their jobs through friends and 
relatives. From the firm perspective, employee 
referrals are a useful device for screening job applicants. Referrals are more valuable than 
anonymous matching because in conveying information about employees’ qualifications, they reduce 
recruiting costs and training costs, and lower monitoring costs. The use of friends and relatives to 
search for jobs often varies by location and by demographic characteristics, but generally this kind of 
job search is quite productive (Ioannides and Loury 2004).  
 
Table 2. Networks as a source of hire. 
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6.2. Labor market models 
The fundamental difference between search theory and network approach in describing labor 
markets is most likely the fact that search theory formally models frictions associated with job 
seekers’ access to information about the availability of the jobs of different types and about the 
conditions of employment (Ioannides and Loury 2004) whereas the network approach acknowledges 
the fact that access to job information is heavily influenced by social structure. However, quite often 
in economic theory it fails to be well-grounded under what circumstances networks are likely to have 
their largest effect on labor market outcomes, and when the effect is positive or negative because 
networks’ influence mechanism on economy is still under study and debate.  
 
6.2.1. Introduction to search and matching models  
Although the simple static neoclassical labor market model19 is useful in illustrating the operations of 
labor markets in the basic microeconomic level, it is deficient in explaining macroeconomic events, 
e.g. in equilibrium, there is no unemployment. The new “economics of imperfect information” was 
invented to deal with uncertainty and matching; this research has led to a growing literature under 
the heading “job search theory”. (Devine and Kiefer 1991)  
 
The search approach was developed as a static model for the behavior of unemployed workers 
(Stigler 1961), yet Mortensen (1970) was among the first to introduce a nonstatic search model. The 
model also extended to include on-the-job search. Formally, the basic model among Devine and 
Kiefer is as follows (see e.g. Rogerson et al. (2005) for a slightly different approach). A worker seeks 
to maximize the expected value of income discounted with r. The income flow while unemployed is b 
and it is constant over the duration of a given spell. Offers are received while unemployed according 
to a Poisson process with parameter δ, which is the arrival rate of offers. A job offer is summarized 
by a wage rate w. Successive job offers received over the course of a spell of unemployment are 
independent realizations from a known wage offer distribution with finite mean and variance. When 
accepted, a job will last forever which is not a crucial assumption, however. The simplest way of 
generating transitions from employment into unemployment is to assume that jobs end for some 
exogenous reason (Rogerson et al. 2005). The search strategy does not depend on the time 
unemployed. This model assumes homogenous firms and workers but there are applications that 
introduce heterogeneous workers and firms although in the minority. When it comes to matching 
models, the general idea is that both workers and firms are heterogeneous and some matches 
                                                 
19
 In neoclassical model workers choose their labor supply by maximizing utility, which is a function of income 
and leisure, subject to a budget constraint in which prizes are given. Aggregate demand and aggregate supply in 
a labor market are derived by a summation of the individual demand and supply functions. (New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics) 
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between workers and firms are more productive than others. Before a match is formed, all workers 
look alike to a firm and all firms look alike to workers; the true time invariant productivity of a worker 
in a particular match can be learned only over time thus there exists imperfect information. (Devine 
and Kiefer 1991).  
 
 
6.2.2. The network approach 
Using networks, informal channels that is, to acquire a job is less expensive for both job seekers and 
firms than formal methods; it also ameliorates the problem of adverse selection because workers 
tend to refer others who are similar to themselves. This is an evidence of homophily – links tend to 
from between individuals who are similar to each other. Employers will thus solicit referrals from 
high-ability employees.  
 
Due to the unclear results of how networks affect the labor market outcome and when the effect is 
at the largest, much of the recent research about job networks points out four important 
considerations to take into account in the analysis; employer, relational, contact and worker 
heterogeneity (Ioannides and Loury 2004). Employer heterogeneity determines which search 
methods –formal or informal – an employer prefers, relational and contact heterogeneity describes 
the variations in the social relationship endowments of individuals, i.e. the position of an individual in 
a network, the network density etc., and finally, worker heterogeneity indicates what kind of 
differences in worker productivity or characteristics there are.      
 
There are mainly two kinds of models, one where the network structure is taken as given and the 
other where the structure is allowed to vary. In the former, the structure remains unchanged and in 
the latter network formation models are introduced. However, compared with the models presented 
in the previous chapters, the formation models are generally simpler and impose stricter 
assumptions. Yet the hypothesis of static, fixed, network structure is not very plausible because the 
structure evolves over time. Due to new social networking sites that provide a means to link creation, 
such as Facebook and LinkedIn in professional contacts, network structure might change probably 
faster than in the case of physical networks, not at least due to lower linkage costs.  
 
6.2.2.1. Fixed network structure 
In the following two models the network structure is assumed static, thus it does not change within 
the periods. The model assuming fixed network structure illustrates the basic logic of labor market 
models incorporating social network structure. Montgomery (1991) tries to embed social structure in 
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a model of the labor market which offers a framework for exploring the equilibrium relationship 
among social structure, wages and profits. This model builds to the observation that workers tend to 
refer others like themselves. Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) extend their model to several 
periods and in addition introduce an exogenous probability of people losing their jobs.  
 
In the model of Montgomery, there are two periods, and each worker lives one period. Half or 
workers are of high and half of low ability. High-ability workers produce one unit of output while low-
ability workers produce zero units. Workers are observationally equivalent, meaning that employers 
are uncertain of the ability of any particular worker thus there is information asymmetry present. 
Each firm may employ at most one worker, and firm’s profit is equal to the productivity of its 
employee minus the wage paid. Each firm must also set wages before learning the productivity of its 
worker and any output-contingent contracts are prohibited. If fully output-contingent pay scheme 
was allowed and possible then firms would not have any incentive to hire through referrals. Each 
period-1 worker knows at most one period-2 worker with probability 𝜏 ∈ [0,1]. For each period-1 
worker holding a tie, the specific period-2 individual known is selected stochastically through a two-
stage process. In the first stage, the period-2 worker’s type is chosen. Conditional upon holding a tie, 
period-1 worker knows a period-2 worker of his own type with probability 𝛼 >
1
2
. In the second stage, 
the specific period-2 worker is chosen randomly from those of the appropriate type. The social 
structure is characterized by two parameters; network density (τ) and inbreeding bias (α). Thus, 
some workers are well connected while others are not. In equilibrium a firm will attempt to hire 
through referral if and only if it employs a high-ability worker in period 1.  
 
Calvó-Armengol  and Jackson (2004) and Montgomery (1991) models differ in that Montgomery does 
not consider any arrival rate of job-offers or referrals or break-up rate, maybe because he only has 
two periods in the model. This model may still provide useful insight in representing how exactly 
wages should react to the use of informal channels in job search when also the outside option, i.e. 
getting a job from a formal channel, is available. Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) also assume for 
simplicity that all jobs are identical. The n agents are heterogeneous as in Montgomery’s model. The 
vector st describes the employment status of the agents at time t. Information about job openings 
arrives; any given agent hears about a job with probability 𝑎 ∈  (0,1). If an agent is unemployed he 
or she will take the job but if an agent is already employed s/he will pass the information along 
randomly to a friend, relative or acquaintance who is unemployed. If all of an agent’s acquaintances 
are already employed, then the job information is simply lost. The network is assumed to be 
nondirected 𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗𝑖 . The probability of the joint event that agent i learns about a job and this job 
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ends up in agent j’s hands is described by 𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝑠 , where 
𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝑠 =   
𝑎                                    𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 = 𝑗               
𝑎
 𝑔𝑖𝑘𝑘 ;𝑠𝑘=0
                                   𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖 = 1, 𝑠𝑗 = 0,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 1;𝑎𝑛𝑑
0                                  𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                             
  
where the vector s describes the employment status of all the agents at the beginning of the period. 
Indirect relationships also play a role. In the short run they are competitors for job information but in 
the long run they help keep an agent’s friends employed which is a benefit. Finally, the model 
introduces an exogenous breakup rate, b, between 0 and 1, the probability that any given employed 
agent will lose his or her job at the end of a given period. In this model, as time unfolds, employment 
evolves as a function of both past employment status and the network of connections. The 
probability of unemployment can fall with the number of links but the average unemployment is 
shown to increase with closed-knittedness, reflecting the fact that the wider the breadth of current 
social ties, the more diversified are the sources of information. Usually, direct connections are more 
important than indirect ones, but in situations with lower arrival rates and higher break-up rates, 
indirect connections can become more important. So this is where the strength of weak links might 
show. Finally, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson state that the long run positive correlation of any 
interconnected agents’ employment implies that there is a clustering of agents by employment 
status, and employed workers tend to be connected with employed workers and vice versa. A more 
general model with fixed network structure is available from the same authors (Calvó-Armengol and 
Jackson 2007). Other models with fixed network structure include e.g. Montgomery (1994) where 
social structure consists of groups of two connected individuals, dyads, and there are both strong 
and weak ties.  
 
Next I show a more complicated model with variable network structure by Calvó-Armengol (2004).            
 
6.2.2.2. Variable network structure 
Permitting for network structure to alter makes the analysis of networks’ impact on the labor market 
outcome less straightforward but brings some important insights into consideration. Assuming static 
network structure does not allow for considering e.g. the dynamics of unemployment by means of 
the network approach, since two networks with the same total number of links but different 
geometry may induce different aggregate unemployment levels (Calvó-Armengol 2004). To illustrate 
the idea of network formation models in labor market settings, I present the Calvó-Armengol (2004) 
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model which is among the few ones20 that have successfully employed a model of strategic network 
formation to the job market context (Ioannides and Loury 2004).  
 
The basic notions apply for the contact networks in Calvó-Armengol (2004). Here, the same principles 
in job transmission as well as breakdown and arrival probabilities apply as in Calvó-Armengol and 
Jackson (2004). Initially, all players are employed. Let 𝛼 = 𝑎(1 − 𝑏) and 𝛽 = 𝑏(1 − 𝑎). An employed 
player has an extra job slot for his contacts with probability α, and an unemployed player need his 
contacts to find a job with probability β. The probability that i gets a job through contacts is 
𝑃𝑖 𝑔 = 1 − 𝑞(𝑛𝑗  𝑔 )𝑗∈𝑁𝑖(𝑔)  where 𝑞  𝑛𝑗  𝑔  = 1 − 𝛼
1−(1−𝑏)𝑛 𝑗 (𝑔)
𝑏𝑛𝑗 (𝑔)
 is the probability that i does 
not get a job from 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖 𝑔 .  Calvó-Armengol finds contrary to Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) 
that direct contacts increase individual employment prospects. Two-links away contacts are 
competitors for information and harm employment prospects. The aggregate unemployment rate 
u(g)21 is determined by  𝑃1 𝑔 ,… ,𝑃𝑛 𝑔   because it also determines how job information flows 
through personal contacts.  
 
The link formation process proceeds as in Bala and Goyal (2000) so that players individually 
announce all the links they wish to form but with the exception that mutual consent is needed. So 
each link ij results in a cost c>0 to both i and j, equal across players.The expected payoff of a player i 
is 
 𝑌𝑖 𝑔 = (1 − 𝑏)     
𝑖 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑠  𝑗𝑜𝑏
+ 𝑏  𝑎 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
+  1 − 𝑎 𝑃𝑖(𝑔)        
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡
 
                 
𝑖  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑
− 𝑐𝑛𝑖(𝑔) 
Here, it can be seen again that Nash equilibrium is too weak an equilibrium concept because the 
empty network is always a Nash equilibrium. Calvó-Armengol refines the equilibrium concept to 
build upon the pairwise stability concept. 𝑔 ∈ 𝒢 is a pairwise-equilibrium network if and only if there 
is a Nash  equilibrium strategy profile which supports g and, for all 𝑖𝑗 ≠ 𝑔, 𝑌𝑖 𝑔 + 𝑖𝑗 > 𝑌𝑖 𝑔  implies 
𝑌𝑗  𝑔 > 𝑌𝑗 (𝑔 + 𝑖𝑗). He concludes that pairwise-equilibrium networks always exist. If 𝑐 > 𝛼𝛽 the 
empty graph is the only pairwise-equilibrium network. Equilibrium networks are non-empty if the net 
value of a first link, 𝛼𝛽 − 𝑐 is nonnegative. As far as efficiency is considered, Calvó-Armengol 
concludes that pairwise-equilibrium networks can generally be inefficient. First, individual incentives 
to form contacts may sometimes be excessive in relation to what is socially desirable, e.g. when per-
                                                 
20
 See the paper by Bramoullé and Saint-Paul (2009) for a recent study introducing endogenous network 
formation model in the labor market context. 
21
 The unemployment rate is 𝑢 𝑔 = 𝛽[1 −  𝑃𝑖(𝑔)/𝑛]𝑖∈𝑁 .Networks that mediate job information fluently are 
such that the aggregate probability  𝑃𝑖(𝑔)𝑖∈𝑁  of finding a job through a contact is high.These networks 
naturally result in low unemployment (Calvó-Armengol 2004). 
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link cost is low, the unemployment can increase with network size. Pairwise-equilibrium networks 
can also be under-connected when agents hold very asymmetric positions in the network; some 
players may have a positive total value from the network while some player gets a negative return to 
it. Therefore, when link addition is welfare enhancing, it reduces unemployment. Yet, the link 
addition may sometimes increase unemployment and decrease welfare.  
 
 
6.3. Network approach explaining phenomena in labor markets – 
comparison with search approach 
Here, I discuss the duration dependence of unemployment and inequality in labor markets and 
compare the explanations of network approach and search theory to the phenomena at hand. There 
would be many interesting issues to consider even within labor markets, but I will restrict the 
analysis to this rather small area due to space constraints. Search theory is able to explain the 
duration dependence but not the persistent inequality. The major shortcoming of search theory is 
nonetheless the assumption of anonymous markets. The trends demonstrating imperfect labor 
markets arise because in practice, not all the employers and job searchers meet, contrary to the 
hypothesis of search theory. This is just what network approach accounts for. Understanding the role 
of networks in determining individual’s position in labor markets could be one crucial factor in 
increasing equality in the labor markets and beyond through e.g. influencing network formation by 
means of transfers, for example.  
6.3.1. Duration dependence of unemployment 
Many of both search theoretic and network approach models recognize the fact that unemployment 
exhibits duration dependence and persistence. That is, the expected probability of obtaining a job 
decreases in the length of time that an agent has been unemployed (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 
2004)22. The starting points of the two approaches in clarifying this phenomenon are nonetheless 
very different.   
 
The search theoretic approach explains the duration dependence of unemployment partly with the 
acceptance wage, the wage an individual is willing to accept and thus no longer searches for a job. 
Mortensen (1970) proposes that the expected duration of search, i.e. unemployment is longer the 
higher the acceptance wage is. This theory assumes some degree of imperfect information and that 
unemployed participants are nonidentical – otherwise there would be no reason to search because 
                                                 
22
 To illustrate the magnitude of duration dependence, Lynch (1989) finds average probabilities of finding 
employment on the order of 0.30 after one week of unemployment, 0.08 after eight weeks of unemployment and 
0.02 after a year of unemployment (see Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2004 for reference). 
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firms would offer the same wage for all openings. Here the unemployment benefit is included in the 
model whereas in the network approach it usually is not a decisive factor in the unemployment 
duration or wage differentials. The optimal acceptance wage is a function of the discount rate, the 
level of unemployment compensation and the proportion of jobs open to the participant, the 
expected duration of employment search is also a function of these same variables (Mortensen 
1970). Devine and Kiefer (1991) draw a conclusion from several papers studying the relationship of 
unemployment benefit b and duration dependence that duration dependence is at least weakly 
sensitive to level of benefits. The unemployment benefit (and the taxation) should however be 
designed in a way that accepting a job where the wage is higher than unemployment benefit would 
always be optimal in money terms, which might not be the case in the low wage level. Thus the level 
of unemployment benefit in low-skill and low wage level can be a crucial factor in determining the 
duration dependence of unemployment which obviously should not occur.  
 
Secondly, arrival rates can be important in producing variation in unemployment duration. The 
longer spells of joblessness experienced by some groups of workers – older, nonwhite, less educated 
– reflect infrequent offers since workers almost always accept an offer once an offer is received. 
Among Devine and Kiefer (1991) there is a direct evidence that variation in arrival rates across 
workers reflect variation in search effort but they cannot provide any details about how the effect 
operates. 
 
In Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) model where employment evolves as a function of both past 
employment status and the network of connections, the longer history of unemployment is more 
likely to come when the direct and indirect connections of an agent are unemployed and not so 
much from the level of acceptance wage or unemployment benefit. Thus, seeing a long spell of 
unemployment for some agent leads to a high conditional expectation that the agent’s contacts are 
unemployed. This in turn leads to a lower probability of obtaining information about jobs through 
the social network. In fact, an agent’s likelihood of being unemployed depends on her position within 
the network (Ioannides and Loury 2004). If there was no network connecting agents, the probability 
of an unemployed agent finding a job would be independent, thus simply the arrival rate a (Calvó-
Armengol and Jackson 2004); then the duration dependence of unemployment would be for the 
most part determined by the arrival rate, the level of acceptance wage and unemployment benefit. 
However, compared to the network approach, the search model fails to consider some aspects that 
network models do. In search theory, no break-up rate is considered thus an employee can hold the 
job forever although on my mind the break-up rate plays a role in the determination of duration. 
Devine and Kiefer (1991) find that although the arrival rate might affect duration dependence, 
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increasing number of job offers is more likely eventually to result only in higher acceptance wage, 
not to a lower employment rate or diminished duration dependence, but this result must hold only if 
the employment is at equilibrium level.  
 
Assuming that the length of the unemployment spell can be decided by the agents and that there are 
always job offers available seems somewhat unrealistic. Also, the way in which workers and 
employers are matched is mostly left unconsidered; the matching happens more or less in a “black 
box” since these models do not specify where exactly the parties meet. On my mind, the theory of 
duration dependence in the search model is rather inadequate since it fails to consider any 
underlying factors affecting the duration – the characteristics of agents, the dependency of the 
probability of getting a job on the length of the unemployment spell etc.  I believe that network 
approach provides a better rationalization for duration dependence of unemployment in labor 
markets, because network theories as such explain for example why some people might receive less 
job offers.  
 
6.3.1.1. Alternative explanations 
Another typical explanation for duration dependence is unobserved heterogeneity which in effect is 
a network externality. This means that agents have idiosyncratic features that are relevant to their 
attractiveness as an employee and are unobservable to the econometrician but observed by 
employers (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2004). The papers studying the relation between 
unobserved heterogeneity and duration dependence have obtained differing results. Consequently, 
whether the true explanation to duration dependence is the theory of unobserved heterogeneity or 
the nature of social capital, that is the quality and the number of links, is presumably not resolved 
(Bramoullé and Saint-Paul 2010). Bramoullé and Saint-Paul (2010) suggest a new mechanism 
generating true duration dependence23.  
 
However, the unobserved heterogeneity of agents could be in fact thought as already implicit in the 
network approach, because to which network(s) an agent belongs and what kind of connections s/he 
has tells about the intrinsic qualities of agents. In other words, if an agent is unemployed, then 
                                                 
23
 Duration dependence would go away once one controls for social capital in a duration model. However, this 
does not mean it is just another form of unobserved heterogeneity. Social capital is not an exogenous individual 
characteristic but its heterogeneity arises endogenously as a result of differing labor market histories across 
individuals. Second, the unobserved heterogeneity critique focuses on the fact that regression analysis spuriously 
delivers duration dependence while there is no duration dependence at the individual level: if one could estimate 
duration dependence with individual fixed effects it would go away. That is not true in Bramoullé and Saint-Paul 
model: even with individual fixed effects, duration dependence arises, because social capital is not a fixed indivi-
dual characteristic but does fall endogenously over time during the unemployment spell. (Bramoullé and Saint-
Paul 2010) 
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agents’ connections are more likely to be unemployed as well and one can conclude that these 
agents might be of low ability, especially if the assumption of homophilous networks is taken into 
consideration. As a result, the network status of agent, if it is possible to reveal in studies, should 
uncover the unobserved heterogeneity. If such means to uncover the network status is not available 
the network status could in fact be one feature of unobserved heterogeneity. Also, although Calvó-
Armengol and Jackson (2004) assume static network structure, the dynamic network structure might 
be more capable in interpreting duration dependence. As different network structures may produce 
different unemployment levels, obviously different structures should also produce different duration 
dependence properties. In other words, maybe it is the evolving network structures that create 
variance to duration dependence and not so much the different characteristics of agents.  
 
Moreover, one could expect there to be differences between the dynamics of networks connecting 
the employed and networks connecting the unemployed (see e.g. Bramoullé and Saint-Paul 2010). 
The assumption e.g. of two different classes of networks is justified because the clustering properties 
and homophilous characteristics of “labor networks” mentioned above. The classes could differ with 
respect to the speed at which new links are added and old links severed and the overall degree how 
fast networks evolve. By assumption, the networks of the unemployed could be less dynamic 
because the unemployed might have less social forums where to form new links that are useful in the 
sense of being employed compared to the employed (coworkers, clients, partners in cooperation 
etc.). If the network stays unchanged, no new links between unemployed and employed people form 
and therefore, no job offers are received. That is, the duration dependence of unemployment might 
be explained by the degree of dynamics of the network structure – the more dynamic network 
structure the less duration dependence is experienced and the shorter is the spells of 
unemployment. Alternatively, if the unemployed and the employed are in the same network, the 
employed agents could be thought of being in the core whereas the unemployed agents in the 
periphery due to the different social environments. Receiving job information from the employed 
agents from the core to periphery is more costly and therefore also less frequent. In addition, 
employed agents are likely not to pass the job information so far away to the periphery but the job 
information is simply lost and the agents in the periphery remain unemployed. The network status of 
an agent could determine the length of the unemployment spell, and basically, only periphery could 
be shown to experience duration dependence of unemployment.     
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6.3.2. Inequality in terms of wage difference and dropout levels 
One of the most extensively studied issues in labor economics is the persistent inequality in wages 
between whites and blacks. Except in duration dependence of unemployment, inequality appears in 
the difference of wage levels and dropout rates, for example. Even if one believes any inequality in 
wages between social groups can be entirely explained by differences in factors such as education, 
skills, and drop-out rates, one is still left to explain why those factors should differ between groups 
(Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2007). Also, much richer information about the impact of networks on 
labor markets may be obtained by tracking wages as opposed to employment. Calvó-Armengol and 
Jackson (2007) find that if agents have reasonable high employment rates, then network effects will 
mainly be observed through their wage dynamics and correlations, as the quality of their jobs may 
vary dramatically even though their employment status may not. Search theoretic models mainly 
assume the wage difference derives from the divergence of the agents’ acceptance wages.  
 
Predicting the wage impact of the usage of networks in job search is not at all straightforward 
because the results on the wage effect of job search through contacts vary among demographic 
properties (Ioannides and Loury 2004). As an example, Korenman and Turner (1996)24  reported that 
among young workers in Boston, whites who found jobs through contacts received 19 percent higher 
wage gains than blacks with similar characteristics. Also, Elliott (1999) found that for rather poorly 
educated workers, the use of informal contacts results in significantly lower wages. These outcomes 
can be implications from the persistent inequality of different social groups in the labor market 
which the profound wage differentials demonstrate. Even though the characteristics of the job 
seeking black and white youth in Korenman and Turner’s (1996) research appear the same it is likely 
that the education level of the blacks’ network(s) in aggregate is lower than that of the whites’ 
network(s). This can be just one attempt among many others to explain the differences in education 
levels. Inequality is nevertheless permanent; the giant component structure due to preferential 
attachment is one rationalization why the differences between groups tend to be growing.  
 
6.3.2.1. Correlation of characteristics in a network 
Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2007) show that improving the state of an agent’s neighbors’ wages or 
employment will improve the agent’s future wages in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. 
Also the wage might be increasing in the number of offers an agent has because competition 
between employers bids the wage up and clearly, agents with many links ought to receive more job 
offers as compared to poorly connected agents. Calvó-Armengol and Jackson’s (2007) theorem of 
                                                 
24
 The two references are to be found in Ioannides and Loury (2004). 
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correlation pattern of wages state that any path connected agents have positively correlated wage 
levels in the steady state and across time, and exhibit strong association25. The theorem of 
association is a generalization of first-order stochastic dominance to random vectors. Except for 
wages, the positive correlation can be thought to apply also to level of education and other 
characteristics of agents. More accurately, an individual’s position in a network is the key 
determinant of his or her level of activity, that is, the level of education (Calvó-Armengol et al. 2008). 
One rationalization why characteristics between groups of agents, social groups, should differ is the 
tendency of agents to form links with agents that have similar characteristics, that is, networks tend 
to be homophilous. Since wages and other features supposedly experience positive correlation, the 
wage gap or more generally the inequality between different social groups (usually different ethnic 
and demographic groups) can grow even higher.  In addition, Montgomery (1992) states that a 
higher probability of a social tie and a higher percentage of educated workers decrease the 
probability of an individual accepting a job offer but increases wage dispersion. These factors work to 
perpetuate and strengthen inequality over time. Increased inbreeding by a group is shown to be 
associated with larger differences from other groups. Selection operates over time via network 
density parameters and inbreeding; individuals pass on their advantages to kin and social 
acquaintances (Ioannides and Loury 2004).  
 
6.3.2.2. Wage effect of drop-out rate  
Another theorem of Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2007) which is presented in the appendix due to 
its complicatedness shows how persistent inequality can arise between two otherwise similar groups 
with different initial employment conditions. Persistent inequality is an important economicand 
sociological issue that search models as such fail to tackle altogether. In fact, differences in drop-out 
rates are an important part of the inequality in wages across races and accounting for dropouts 
increases e.g. the black-white wage gap (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2004). The positive correlation 
of agents’ employment status also serves as a basis for understanding the differences in drop-out 
rates which then results in inequality in wages and employment rates. Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 
(2004) consider two identical networks except that one starts with each of its agents having a better 
employment status than their counterparts. Remaining in the labor market involves some costs and 
agents in the network with worse initial starting conditions have a lower expected discounted stream 
of future income from remaining in the network. This difference might cause some agents to drop 
out in the worse network but remain in the better one. Dropping out has a value 0, and agent 
                                                 
25
 Strong association captures the idea that better information about any of the dimensions in π leads to strictly 
higher expectations regarding every other dimensions in π. One implication of this is that W i and Wj are 
positively correlated for any i and j in π. (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2007) 
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chooses to stay in the labor force when the discounted expected future wages exceed the costs. Due 
to contagion effect some agents connected to dropouts also drop out, thus a slight change in initial 
conditions can lead to a substantial difference in drop-out decisions and sustained differences in 
employment rates. Because dropping out hurts the prospects of the group further, this can have 
strong implications for inequality patterns between different social groups (Calvó-Armengol and 
Jackson 2004).  
 
Therefore, in the network of blacks and less educated mentioned above there is probably a higher 
dropout rate because of the lower future discounted wage sum in comparison to the higher 
educated. Due to the contagion effects of the dropout decision of an individual agent dropping out 
results in a rather permanent wage gap between the two groups. The lower wage level accordingly 
discourages the blacks to educate themselves as much as would be socially optimal because the cost 
of education would be higher than the future wage sum given the employment and wage level.  
Clearly, in a networked economy, agent’s actions impact other agents’ decisions and possibilities 
because agents are interconnected; search models do not assume any game theoretic approach and 
therefore the only explanatory factors for the labor market outcome are essentially wage and 
unemployment benefit which obviously simplifies the analysis substantially. Labor markets are 
essentially competitive, because usually, many agents compete for the same job offer; one should at 
least take into consideration the decision of others when setting the level of acceptance wage. 
 
In addition, the wage impact of using contacts in job search could be determined by the position in 
the network. The agents who are in the core or where the distance to the agent who has provided 
the job information is short the wage effect could be thought to be higher. Then again, those agents 
with long distance to the agent providing job information should be always expected to prefer formal 
channels in job search. The jobs that agents within longer distance are able to receive through 
contacts are probably those that more proximate job seekers have passed meaning that the job offer 
is less attractive in wage and other terms; which might also explain the lower wage impact. The 
finding of individuals forming links with people who are alike supports the fact that the black and 
white in fact are in different networks.  
 
6.3.2.3. Wage effect of tie strength 
The wage effect of the strength of the tie is controversial and no unambiguous results are found; 
ignoring the wage issue, it might be that weak ties are a more effective channel to find a job than 
strong ties. Granovetter (1974) argued that weak ties are superior to strong ties to providing support 
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in getting a job because they involve a secondary ring of acquaintances that have contacts with 
networks outside ego’s network and therefore offer new sources of information on job 
opportunities, weak ties thus appear to be a way for an individual to diversify her social resources. 
Actually, Boorman’s (1975) model was the first to ask how social groups accommodate the 
transmission of job information, where individuals choose how to allocate effort over maintaining 
strong and weak ties. Under certain conditions, workers using more their weak ties than strong ties 
to find a job receive a higher wage (Zenou 2007). As far as the network position and strength of a tie 
are considered, Zenou (2007) finds that workers living far away from jobs experience higher 
unemployment rates than those living close to jobs because they mainly rely on their strong ties to 
obtain information about jobs. Workers residing closer to jobs interact more with weak ties than 
those residing further away from jobs. However, Montgomery (1992) suggests that weak ties 
increase reservation wages but it does not imply a similar relationship between wages and the type 
of tie used to find a job. Therefore, the (negative) correlation between the strength of the tie and the 
wage attained might not be due to tie strength after all but due to position in the network.  
 
 
 
 
 
6.4. Discussion 
In the general job search and matching model the fact how workers and employers learn about each 
other and how information is acquired is often overlooked even though a typical feature of labor 
markets is that there is widespread use of friends, relatives, and other acquaintances to search for 
jobs and it has increased over time. It seems clear that the more links an agent has to employed 
agents, the less likely it is that agent ends up unemployed. Nonetheless, the wage effect of being 
employed through contacts varies between and most probably also within a network – depending on 
the position in the network.   
 
The network approach is complementary to other theories and is not meant to be exhaustive; in 
particular, it offers an explanation for why the workers of a particular type in a particular location 
(assuming networks correlate with location) might experience different employment characteristics 
than the same types of workers in another location, ceteris paribus. For instance, where the search 
theory sees duration dependence arising from the frictions in the labor market, the network 
approach interprets the frictions being consequence from the certain structures of networks 
observed in the economy. Also, the role of unobserved heterogeneity cannot perhaps be invalidated 
by network approach altogether though networks serve as a more multidimensional theory. These 
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results imply that theories implementing the network approach should be developed and studied 
further. 
 
The level of social interactions within a group could also explain why some individuals receive less job 
offers. Bayer et al. (2004) find that social interactions are stronger when individuals are more likely to 
interact because of education, age and the presence of children; interactions are stronger when one 
of the two individuals is strongly attached to the labor market, and are weaker when both are drop-
outs, young or married females. Also the quality of social interaction or the quality and the nature of 
information can vary between networks. It might be that in the network of women, less job 
information is transmitted as compared to a network consisting of men, the employment level of the 
groups being the same. There might also be cultural differences concerning what kind of information 
is more likely to diffuse in a network and ultimately, to what extent the social networks are taken 
advantage of in job search. The cultural and cross network differences in information transmission 
could also explain why the wage effect of using networks can significantly vary between groups.  
 
Differences in initial conditions combined with differences in the employment histories and with 
divergent network dynamics of two otherwise identical networks produce sustained inequality of 
wages and drop-out rates that feed each other (Ioannides and Loury 2004). That is, position in a 
network seems to be rather important in determining individual’s professional success in terms of 
wage level and the decision whether to drop out or not. From the social planner’s point of view, this 
implies that interventions in the labor market, such as providing incentives for individuals not to drop 
out, are likely to have noticeable and long-lasting effects in the battle against inequality. Ioannides 
and Loury (2004) sees that it would be more effective to target groups of agents who are highly 
connected, taking advantage of social attachment effects among agents. Correspondingly, 
institutions that seek to network otherwise isolated individuals can potentially bring about socially 
desirable outcomes. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have studied the models of network formation and networks’ explicative power in 
rationalizing the labor market phenomena. One of the key findings here is that social structure 
strongly impacts the access to information, such as job information. This is the underlying 
explanation why networks should have an impact on the outcome of any networked markets such as 
labor markets that I have been discussing. The same applies to trade patterns in the networked 
markets of goods – the total welfare could be in line with the predictions of the neoclassical model 
but the surplus might be differently distributed between the buyers and the sellers. This subject is 
important because the traditional economic theories dominating the field assume agents act 
independently and are perfectly informed, and that markets are anonymous, which does not 
coincide with reality. Indeed, I consider the theories incorporating network approach as successful in 
explaining the dynamics of imperfectly functioning economy. I assume that the mismatch between 
supply and demand arises because all the actors in the markets do not meet. The structure of 
networks in the economy determines which agents operate together. Hence, the network approach 
is partly able to reason why there are market frictions and additionally, the explicative power of 
networks goes beyond than that of the market frictions.  
 
In this concluding chapter, I shortly revise the key findings of this work. Then, I discuss the role of 
networks in labor markets in more detail. I conclude by deliberating the interrelationship of networks 
and information transmission.    
 
7.1. The models of network formation compared  
The models of network formation can be divided into two branches depending on how the links are 
formed. The random graph models explore the network formation on a network level and compare 
the emerged structure with real social networks. The basic model sees links arising independently 
whereas the extensions acknowledge that links form among conditional probabilities because there 
are underlying factors such as the tendency for people to form links with individuals having similar 
characteristics.  Strategic form models describe the network formation process from the perspective 
of utility maximizing agents where the decision of forming a link essentially depends on the payoffs 
and costs related to it. The outcomes from the different solution concepts can be totally distinct from 
one another. The dilemma with the pairwise stability concept of the strategic models is that a 
network might be classified as stable too easily and that it only allows for one deviating action at a 
time. On the other hand, Nash equilibrium concept results in too many Nash stable networks of 
which many are irrational from the economic point of view, such as an empty network. The pairwise 
Nash equilibrium combining the properties of the two solution concepts could solve the problem of 
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the concepts giving totally disjointed results, and should therefore be paid more attention to in the 
literature. 
 
Although there are guidelines when random graph models and when strategic models suit modeling 
a certain link formation process, it might still be challenging to actually distinguish which networks 
form randomly and which nonrandomly. Even in strategic form models, there must be some 
randomness involved in that which agents actually meet before the links are formed. From the set of 
(randomly) met individuals an agent announces with whom s/he wants to form a link. Thus the set of 
agents who are in the network formation game would be determined randomly. For instance,  
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) do not even assume any pregame phase but there just seem to be an 
(in)finite supply or some kind of line of agents in the game who meet and agree on whether to form a 
link or not.  
 
 
7.2. Networks and labor markets 
Labor markets are one typical example of networked markets where people benefit from 
connections with neighbors who provide information about job opportunities. Networks are a 
significant informal means of finding a job; hence also the focus of the labor market theories has 
been shifting towards network approach during the past few years. The search theoretic models 
provide a useful insight into how labor market should work in theory if the markets were anonymous 
and if only a formal job search method was available. In reality, imperfect labor markets experience 
duration dependence of unemployment and wage inequality which the search theoretic framework 
comes short of explicating. Wage differences have natural explanations such as skill differences but 
the distinct levels of dropping out from labor force between networks are major decisive factors in 
creating wage gaps between the groups. This is one example demonstrating the explicative power of 
the network approach. Since the labor markets actually are networked and networks play a 
considerable role in mediating job information the labor market models with the network approach 
gaining ground within the economic research is justified.  
 
The majority of the labor market models with the network approach does not apply variable network 
structure but just explain these phenomena by the presence of networks. Ioannides and Loury (2004) 
call the variable structure as an endogenous job information network and the given structure as 
exogenous. Introducing variable network structure makes the analysis less straightforward and 
consequently, the results about the impact of contacts especially on the employment status of an 
agent become controversial. The key issue here is that direct contacts are beneficial because they 
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improve an individual’s information sources, but two-links away contacts are detrimental because 
they create competitors for the information possessed by a direct contact. The rivalry is the reason 
why more general analyses are difficult since the sign and intensity of the payoff spillovers are very 
much dependent on the geometry of the network (Ioannides and Loury 2004).   
 
There are several mechanisms sufficient to produce segregation in labor markets. The actual skill 
distribution of agents is one factor producing segregation but also networks function as a source of 
asymmetry in labor markets. However, the inequality in the markets does not just occur passively 
without agents‘ consent. As the evidence of homophilous networks show, network formation 
depends on sorting on individuals’ own characteristics when individuals choose whom to associate 
with (Ioannides and Loury 2004). This self-selection in deciding with whom an agent wishes to form a 
link with based e.g. on individual’s own academic ability or social background most certainly 
increases inequality. This kind of sorting is however seen as egalitarian by most of the people, 
presumably because it is based on individuals’ free choice of association (Ioannides and Loury 2004). 
Recognizing that the inequality in labor markets and generally in the society is also due to individuals’ 
own choices and not just due to pure discrimination e.g. from the employers side makes the political 
intervention to the network formation more complicated and harder to justify.  
  
Nevertheless, whether it is due to individuals’ own self-selection mechanism or network dynamics 
one can note that many phenomena are self-enforcing since economy is organized into networks. 
Agents’ actions shape the structure of networks but network structure also affects the way in which 
individuals act. The very structure of the network seems self-enforcing since the structure tends to 
converge into a giant component and most networks experience fat tails. Because of link formation 
mechanisms like triadic closure and homophilous features of networks, agents similar to each other 
tend to group together and even reside in the same geographical areas (see picture 6). The structure 
thus “enables” for the inequality to be unevenly distributed. Some agents seem to have many good 
quality links in terms of education and employment while other agents in minority have only few 
links of worse quality in terms of utility to the agent. Therefore, also dropping out is self-enforcing – 
every agent dropping out from labor force lowers the future discounted value of staying in the labor 
force of other agents. Eventually, agents with initially worse conditions are even worse off.     
 
What the research of labor markets with the network approach should account for though is the 
increasing role of internet in job search.  The structure of networks in labor markets should be 
variable because e.g. social networking sites provide a low-cost forum for links to form compared to 
that of physical links; thus it is very likely that the changes in the network structure are significant. In 
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addition, it might be that internet causes dissimilar links to form than would form in a normal 
physical contact. That is, links crossing the borders of different social classes or educational levels 
might form that would otherwise not form. If this is so, social networking sites could actually 
diminish the length of the path between nodes so that the border between the core and the 
periphery somewhat blurs. My educated guess is that links formed via social networking sites must 
be formed more randomly than the ones formed “nonvirtually”. Therefore, assuming that internet 
does play a significant role in the employment process, the random formation models are very 
relevant in the labor markets. Accordingly, the part of random graph models should be explored 
more in detail.   
 
7.3. Networks and flow of information 
Social networks serve as a channel for information transmission. In addition, the structure of the 
society matters to the economic outcome; the extent to which a society is segregated across 
different groups can be critical in determining things like how quickly information diffuses, and the 
extent to which there is under-investment in human capital, to name a few points (Curarrini et al. 
2007). 
 
Access to information is heavily influenced by social structure. For example, many social networking 
sites are designed so that they promote and support information diffusion from one agent to 
another. The information one is able to access depends on the position in the network. As a source of 
information networks most likely reduce the problem of information asymmetry and thus the 
common problem of moral hazard because one can trust the source of information, because in a 
network, trust is likely to emerge as Granovetter (1974) finds. Networks do not however provide for 
perfect information; agents are not perfectly informed contrary to the assumption of neoclassical 
theory but the level of information depends on the overall structure of the network and the position 
of the agent in the network. In fact, the information asymmetry between members of a network not 
connected to each other (or very distant from each other) can be even greater than in the 
hypothetical setting without networks. The fact that the society is organized into networks causes 
individuals to have asymmetric positions in the economy with respect to access to information which 
might result in persistent inequality between individuals.  
 
Furthermore, the position of an agent compared to that of the other agent’s position in the network 
could define the level of information asymmetry since agents close to each other and homophilous 
agents tend to have correlated information (Golub and Jackson 2008). The less distant agents the 
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more correlated information, and also the degree to which agents are connected with the same 
agents could determine the level of asymmetry.  
 
When reflecting the results of this work, it has also become clear that networks affect the behavioral 
patterns well beyond labor markets. Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) find that the results found 
in the labor market model could in fact be applied to phenomena like smoking or getting involved in 
criminal activity. Also, Stovel and Fountain (2006) find that skill differences between groups and 
social segregation in the form of biased or closed networks are both associated with high levels of 
segregations within firms. Due to segregation within a firm, workers cannot be assumed to possess 
perfect information. The lack of perfect information might affect a firm’s profit decreasingly which 
might as a consequence result in lower economic welfare. As said, networks can also determine how 
new products diffuse by affecting the purchase decision of individuals, particularly when the decision 
is affected by peers. For these reasons, social structure determines the outcome of many economic 
transactions.  
 
 
 
7.4. Suggestions for future research 
However, identifying the network effects is not at all simple. Many effects that one thinks are due to 
networks might be due to some other underlying factors. Several recent economic studies emphasize 
network effects as neighborhood effects; they examine whether it is appropriate to associate 
geographical proximity with the facilitation of information flow. Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan 
(2000) emphasize methods that allow them to distinguish between the effects of networks from 
those of unobservable characteristics of individuals and of the communities where they live in their 
study about the impact of social networks on welfare participation. They attempt to distinguish 
between the effects of geographical proximity and of information transmission made possible by 
proximity. They find that individuals who interact more with others speaking the same language are 
therefore more likely to be influenced by other members of that group; they interpret these findings 
as the evidence of network effects. Yet, there are also studies where network effect is considered as 
unimportant.  
 
All in all, it might be hard to study the impact of networks due to the overall difficulty to determine 
who belongs to which network and who is connected to whom. There might not be the tools 
available to tackle the whole network structure or the network position of an individual. In addition, 
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what one interprets as a network effect might indeed just be due to the geographical proximity of 
two agents and vice versa. 
 
For research purposes one needs more sophisticated tools than graphs to denote and explore the 
network structure if such do not already exist. On the other hand, revealing the structure of social 
online networks ought to be less complicated because of documented information about the links 
than that of physical networks. The structure of virtual networks could provide new insights also 
about the structure of physical networks. Therefore, the role of internet in the formation of networks 
and accordingly the social networking sites deserve more attention in the study. The inclusion of 
social online networks might both simplify and complicate the analysis in that social online networks 
and physical networks can be highly correlated, but again, due to the low costs of link formation, the 
structure of virtual networks might be altering much more compared to physical networks. 
 
Indeed, even though it was not within the frame of my work, discussion about the role of institutions 
in contributing to the formation of networks should earn further consideration. That is, economy’s 
social and informational infrastructure, such as internet applications facilitating or impeding agents’ 
access to resources can have a noteworthy effect on which networks form and how quickly and 
through which route the information or resources flow and consequently, how much there is 
information asymmetry.  
 
Additionally, as also Ioannides and Loury (2004) state, the implications of tie strength in endogenous 
job information networks literature should be researched more in the literature26. Whether the tie 
strength actually impacts the outcome of individuals in the labor markets is still not clear. Also, both 
in the labor information networks as well as in the general literature of network formation it would 
be interesting to see some hybrid models incorporating features from both random and strategic 
form models. All in all, the network approach should be implemented into various economic settings. 
 
                                                 
26
 In fact, Tassier and Menczer (2008) discuss about the effects of social network structure on inequality; they 
study how randomness of the network and also how randomness of the flow of job information affects the labor 
market outcome and consequently the emerging inequality. 
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Appendix 
Labor market equilibrium in neoclassical theory 
 
Different graphs 
Here, when comparing the two graphs, picture 8 and picture 9, one can notice that the average degree of a 
vertex in a Bernoulli random graph is seemingly lower than in the left hand small world graph. That is, the small 
world graph clearly exhibits clustering and fat tails.  
 
 
  
  
Picture 9. Small world graph.   Picture 10. Bernoulli random graph. 
 
 
Picture 11. Center-sponsored star. (Bala and Goyal 2000) 
 
Picture 8. Wages are initially too high and there is unemployment of ab. This causes wage rates 
to fall and employment increases as a result from Q1 to Q2. Any unemployment left in the 
economy would be purely voluntary unemployment. (New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics) 
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Picture 12. Examples of Nash networks in the linear payoff case. The number of Nash networks increase quite rapidly 
with n. For example, there are 5, 58, 1069 and in excess of 20 000 Nash networks as n takes values 3,4,5 and 6, respectively. 
(Bala and Goyal 2000). 
 
 
Levels of network homophily
Complete Homophily
90% Homophily
Simulated Networks
N = 220, <k> = 5
θ = .5 θ = .9 θ = 1
Random
 
Picture 13. Levels of network homophily (Stovel and Fountain, University of Washington 2006) 
 
 
Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2007) model  
𝑊𝑖𝑡  is the wage of the agent i at time t. The vector 𝑤𝑡 = (𝑤1𝑡 ,… ,𝑤𝑛𝑡 ) is a realization of the wage levels at t.  
The random variable 𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the employment status of an agent at time t. The vector 𝑠𝑡 ∈ {0,1}
𝑛  describes the 
employment status at time t.  
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𝑏𝑖 ∈  0,1  is the breakup rate. 𝑝𝑖𝑗 (𝑊𝑡−1) is the probability that i originally hears about a job in a given period 
and then it is eventually j that ends up with an offer for that job. 𝑝𝑖 𝑤 =  𝑝𝑗𝑖  𝑤 𝑗  is the expected number of 
offers that i will get when the wage state in the last period is w. 
𝑂𝑖𝑡  denotes the new opportunities that i has in hand at the end of the hiring process in period t. The wage of 
agent i evolves as 
𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝑤𝑖(𝑊𝑖 ,𝑡−1,𝑂𝑖𝑡 )𝑆𝑖𝑡  
 
Wage patterns and dynamics 
To measure the wage patterns and dynamics, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2007) use the measure of 
association. A probability measure µ describing a random vector is associated if 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝜇 (𝑓,𝑔) ≥ 0.  
Starting from the steady state distribution, there is a strictly positive correlation between the 
wage statuses of any path connected agents and at any times, for large enough T. That is, for 
any times t and t’ and large enough T, 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑇[𝑊𝑖𝑡 ,𝑊𝑗 𝑡 ′ ] > 0 
where i and j are path connected and Cov
T
 is the covariance associated with the T-period 
subdivision starting at time 0 under the steady state distribution 𝜇𝑇  . 
 
Dropping out and long run inequality 
Let di ∈ {0, 1} denote i’s decision of whether to stay in the labor market. Each agent discounts future wages at a 
rate 0 < 𝛿𝑖 < 1 and pays an expected discounted cost 𝑐𝑖 ≥ 0 to stay in. Agents dropping out get a payoff of 
zero. An augmented economy is (N, p, b, c, δ), where c and δ are vectors of costs and discount rates. 
When an agent i exits the labor force, we reset the p’s so that 𝑝𝑖𝑗  𝑤 = 𝑝𝑗𝑖  𝑤 = 0 for all j 
and w, but do not alter the other 𝑝𝑘𝑗 ′𝑠. The agent who drops out has his or her wage set to zero. 13 
Therefore, when an agent drops out, it is as if the agent disappeared from the economy. 
Fix an augmented economy (N, p, b, c, δ) and a starting state 𝑊0  =  𝑤. A vector of decisions 
d is an equilibrium if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, di = 1 implies 
 
 
 
If 𝑑∗(𝑤)𝑖 = 𝑑
∗(𝑤′)𝑖 = 1, then the distributions of i’s wages and employment Wit and Sit for any t under the 
maximal equilibrium following w’ first-order stochastic dominate those under the maximal equilibrium 
following w, with strict dominance for large enough t if 𝑑∗(𝑤)𝑗 ≠ 𝑑
∗(𝑤′)𝑗  for any j who is path connected to 
i. In fact, for any increasing𝑓: ℝ+
𝑛 → ℝ and any t 
 
 
 
with strict inequality for some specifications of c and δ.  
 
This shows how persistent inequality can arise between two otherwise similar groups with different initial 
employment conditions. 
